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FOREWORD
The papers collected here represent the Strategic
Studies Institute’s (SSI) continuing efforts to foster dialogue on topical issues in international security among
experts from the United States and abroad. These papers are taken from the conference that SSI conducted on
January 25-26, 2010, entitled, “Contemporary Issues in
International Security,” at the Finnish embassy in Washington, DC. This was the second conference that SSI organized, bringing together U.S., Russian, and European
experts to discuss important questions in contemporary
world affairs. We hope to continue these conferences
on an annual basis because of the importance of such
dialogue among experts and governments. But rather
than publishing as a book, which we did in 2009, SSI has
decided to publish them on a panel-by-panel basis. This
particular collection is devoted to the question of Russia’s prospects in Asia, a question that is all too often
overlooked in U.S. analyses of either Russia or Asia.
Accordingly, we hope to help remedy that blindspot
in U.S. analyses (a blindspot not found in analogous
Russian analysis) by bringing the views of eminent Russian and U.S. analysts to our readers’ attention. We hope
that the succeeding collections of papers on topics of
equal importance will similarly contribute to improved
mutual understanding and ongoing dialogue regarding
the great questions of world affairs.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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INTRODUCTION
On January 25-26, 2010, the Strategic Studies Institute ( SSI) conducted a conference entitled, “Contemporary Issues in International Security,” at the Finnish
embassy in Washington, DC. This was the second in
what we hope will be annual conferences bringing together U.S., European, and Russian scholars and experts to discuss such issues in an open forum. The importance of such regular dialogues among experts is
well known, and the benefits of these discussions are
considerable. Just as we published the papers of the
2008 conference in 2009 (Stephen J. Blank, ed., Prospects for US-Russian Security Cooperation, Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
2009), we are doing so again. However, in this case,
we are publishing the papers on a panel-by-panel basis.
The panel presented here was devoted to an unjustly neglected topic, Russia’s standing and prospects
in East Asia. While U.S. policymakers openly discuss
the possibilities for partnership with Russia in Europe
and Central Asia, they often do not even bother to
mention Russia as a player in East Asia, an omission
that no Russian statesman has ever made, and with
good reason. Indeed, for the last decade, Russia has
consistently striven to upgrade its profile and capabilities in Asia. The papers set forth here depict three
differing analyses of the extent to which Russia has
succeeded or failed in this endeavor, including the nature of the complex East Asian environment in which
Russia must operate. They make a strong case against
such neglect of Russia as an Asian player, either in
the analytical or policymaking process. These papers

vii

present differing U.S. and Russian assessments of
Russia’s Asian prospects for our readers’ benefit. They
will, so to speak, serve to “kick off” the ensuing publication of the papers from the other panels which dealt
with issues of equal, if not even greater, consequence
in contemporary security.

		
Stephen J. Blank
Editor
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CHAPTER 1
RUSSIA’S POSTURE IN AND POLICY
TOWARDS NORTHEAST ASIA
Viacheslav B. Amirov
INTRODUCTION
Northeast Asia (NEA) is a place where economic
interdependence among the NEA “troika”—China, Japan and South Korea—is growing. Moreover, intense
interaction within
�����������������������������������������
that troika will determine the extent of further economic (and political) integration in
the much wider region—Pacific Asia (which stretches
from areas of Pacific Russia in the north to New Zealand in the south).
This is a very important fact for Russia, though an
understanding of its significance for the country has
come only very recently. The long-standing issue for
Russia is the future of the Russian Far East (Pacific
Russia or RFE), its social and economic development,
and its security. Pacific Russia’s future depends to a
great extent on its involvement in the NEA regional
economy.
Yet Russia continues to maintain a low profile in
NEA, despite new efforts made by the Russian government to move the center of gravity of the country’s
economy eastward, towards its vast, uninhabited territory with its huge potential resources. But the NEA
still remains a rather small blip on the Russian foreign
policy radar. For example, in the list of priorities announced by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov,
in his 2009 interview regarding the country’s foreign
policy agenda, one finds the so-called reset in the rela-
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tions with the United States, European security, the
importance of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), etc. As usual, NEA and Russia’s national
interests in the Far East received short shrift. China
was mentioned, viz., the importance of “developing
multi-dimension relations with China and our other
partners in BRIC [Brazil, Russia, India, and China].”1
Granted, relations with China have great importance
for Russia, but BRIC remains a phantom entity with
quite an unclear future.
In the 1990s, both negative and positive tendencies
surfaced in the vast RFE and Eastern Siberia region.
Negative tendencies included a shrinking population
(which is still the case), disrupted economic ties with
other parts of the country (often called the mainland),
and deteriorating standards of living. On the positive
side, changes in the country allowed for and encouraged population moves from the north of the region
southward to areas with better climate and other conditions for human habitation. More importantly, after
decades of insulation from its neighbors during the
days of the Soviet Union, the Russian Far East was
opened for developing direct ties in various fields with
China, Japan, and other neighbors in the Asia Pacific
without having to ask for permission from Moscow
to make every trade deal. This was a great help to the
Russian Far East in surviving economically through
the hardship of the 1990s. It also elevated Pacific Russian trade volume with Asia Pacific countries, making it larger than trade volume between other parts of
Russia and the Asia Pacific countries. Unfortunately,
the levels of criminality and corruption in the RFE
have not improved and may even have gotten worse.
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During the 1990s, the RFE was largely ignored
by the federal authorities. But after being preoccupied with building so-called “power vertical” across
the country in the first years of the new century, the
federal government has finally started to pay more attention to Russia’s most distant region. There are two
broad reasons for that change. First, China’s economic
rise provides both challenges and opportunities for
Russia in the eastern dimension of its foreign economic relations. Second, it has become apparent recently
that overdependence on European markets for exporting energy resources (Russia’s main export item) may
present its own problems now and in the future.
That is why the main tendency in Russia’s posture
and policy vis-à-vis NEA is currently characterized by
an effort on the part of the Russian government to reintegrate the country’s Far East into the national economy and to secure a favorable economic and political
environment in the immediately neighboring NEA
region. Economic development of the RFE cannot be
achieved without its having broad economic ties with
Russia’s main trading partners in NEA. In the long
run, such development should improve Russia’s security standing in the region and allow the country
to play its proper role in the community of regional
powers.
Becoming an important part of the NEA should be
a cornerstone of Russia’s strategic relations with Asia
Pacific. Russia’s trade with the NEA troika has been
rising in recent years. China has become the main
trading and economic partner in the Asia Pacific for
Russia. Russia–China trade is comparable with Russia’s trade with its most important partners in Europe.
After a period of stagnation in 1990s, Russian trade
with Japan has increased significantly during the 5
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years preceding the eruption of the current global financial crisis. South Korea has also become important
economic partner for Russia. Of course, the global financial crisis reduced the volume of Russian foreign
trade in 2009, but it can hardly reverse the underlying
long-term trend of expanding economic ties between
Russia and its main neighbors in NEA. Obviously,
there are problems and obstacles to overcome in the
immediate future.
At the same time, it should be noted that trade
volume between any two troika states is much bigger
than Russia’s trade with any one of those countries
(for example, Russia’s trade with China rose to U.S.$56
billion in 2008, but overall trade between Japan and
China reached U.S.$266 billion in the same year).2 So
Russia faces a long-term challenge in how to catch up
and become more deeply engaged in economic interaction in the sub-region.
Energy is one of the main tools of Russia’s foreign
economic policy, if not the most important (though,
for example, Gazprom’s activities have not proved to
be an unvarnished political blessing). The move to the
East is also a part of Russia’s energy geopolitics—to
diversify markets and to be involved in the emerging
and very rapidly developing economic integration of
the neighboring region. That is why the enhancement
of energy supply and processing capabilities (to develop new oil and gas projects and to build pipelines,
oil refineries, liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants, petrochemical and chemical factories, export facilities at
sea ports, etc.) is a quite natural step in diversifying
the RFE economy, thus reversing the ongoing depopulation and lagging standards of living in the region.
In the end, it will improve the country’s standing in
NEA. This movement of Russian energy programs
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eastwards has also coincided with attempts to diversify overseas markets for Russian resources. Europe,
for various reasons, has recently shown a reluctance
to increase its dependence on Russia’s supplies of oil
and gas, and even a desire to reduce Russia’s share in
the European energy supply balance (a move that had
been supported by the George W. Bush administration with its policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus).
In its relations with Europe, Russia has a combination of rather comprehensive economic, political, and
security interests. Compared to Europe, Russia’s ties
with NEA are objectively less developed, less comprehensive, and more distant culturally. Consequently,
there is a continuing conceptual debate in Russia:
whether to choose a European orientation or a Eurasian one, or to choose both.
Advocates of the European option argue that only
ties with Europe can help Russia to implement its recently declared program of comprehensive national
modernization, i.e., in all spheres. Such advocates say
that Russia needs European technology, capital, and
even cultural input that the country cannot get from
China or Japan, or both. They also argue that in any
economic interaction with China, Russia will play a
limited and subordinate role as resource supplier for
the Asian giant’s economy. The latter role is widely
seen in Russia as an extremely negative path of economic development: a national reliance on natural
resources in economic development is itself objectionable, but the objections are aggravated by a fear that
Russia’s economy will be reduced to a simple resource
adjunct to China’s industrial and knowledge-intensive
economy. Thus, the emphasis on economic diversification in Russia.
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Renewed interest in the RFE from the federal government should obviously be supported by relevant
tools to achieve stated goals—to encourage significant
social and economic development so as to improve living standards in the region (it is absolutely necessary
to stop depopulation of the RFE) and make the RFE a
genuine part of the NEA economy. In the “National
Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020”
endorsed by President Medvedev in May 2009, there
are two points (Nos. 62 and 64) that are particularly
relevant to the subject of this paper: No. 62 directs the
government in the mid-term perspective “to complete
a forming of basic transport, energy, information, and
military infrastructure, particularly in the Arctic zone,
Eastern Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation.” No. 64 advocates balanced, complex, and
systematic development of all regions of the Russian
Federation in the interest of preserving stability of
national security. In the long run, to prevent possible
threats to the national security arising from disproportionate development of different regions, it is necessary to form specially groomed industrial-territorial
zones in Russia’s South and Volga river regions, Urals
and Siberia, in the Far East and others.3
Among measures to achieve the aforementioned
goals are the allocation of federal funds for infrastructure improvement in the RFE, encouragement of Russian private investments entailing physical movement
into the area, and economic cooperation with national
neighbors, taking advantage of their capital, technology, and labor force.
The federal government has chosen at least two
ways to channel budget money into the RFE economy.
The first is represented by the old pattern of launching
a new regional strategy for socio-economic develop-
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ment. As we know, all previous programs, beginning
with the first one initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev after
his famous Vladivostok speech in 1986, egregiously
failed as they had poorly formulated goals and lacked
any viable bureaucratic mechanisms upon which to
base implementation.
A ray of hope emerged at the end of December
2009, with the Russian government’s approval of the
“Strategy for Socio-Economic Development of the Far
East and the Baikal Region until 2025 (Strategy 2025),”
in addition to the current “Special Federal Program for
Economic and Social development of the Far East and
the Baikal region until 2013 (Federal Program 2013).”
The final decision to approve Strategy 2025 coincided
with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s December 2009
trip to Primorsky Krai, where he symbolically initiated
the first stage of the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO)
oil pipeline from Russia’s newest and most promising
oil fields in East Siberia to Skovorodino, close to the
Chinese border, and also the oil terminal facilities in
the port of Kozmino which is also an important part of
the huge ESPO project.4
In the Strategy 2025, the Russian government declares that the strategic goal of planned social and
economic development is fulfillment of the geopolitical task of halting depopulation of the RFE and Baikal
region. To achieve this goal, the federal government
wants to achieve in these areas a highly developed
and diversified economy and comfortable standard of
living. This will require at least a higher rate of economic growth in those regions than the national average.5 The highly ambitious Strategy 2025 will require
persistent federal government efforts to ensure the
effectiveness of measures taken and proper spending
of allocated funds from the federal budget; both the
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Strategy 2025 and Federal Program 2013 received a
special boost when Russia invited the 2012 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit to be held
in Vladivostok.
The second way to channel budget money into the
RFE economy is a new development. Russia has now
undertaken international obligations to improve infrastructure in Vladivostok and surrounding areas by
the time of the APEC summit in 2012. Consequently,
at the federal level both President Dmitry Medvedev
and Prime Minister Putin paid a great deal of attention to the economy of the Pacific Russia in 2009, not
to mention increased frequency of top government official visits to the region. We may anticipate that 2010
will be also busy for them in that regard, implying a
considerable infusion of government money.
Unfortunately, in 2009 Russian authorities at various levels took actions revealing just how much is yet
to be learned on the Russian side about dealing properly with one’s neighbors. These rather clumsy acts
disclosed the need for Russia to apply a more nuanced
policy in relations with its neighbors in NEA. The following examples were widely publicized in Russia
and abroad:
•	The sudden police shutdown of a huge wholesale and retail market in the northern part of
Moscow (Cherkizovo) where many Chinese
and Vietnamese shuttle-traders were doing
their business of selling goods coming from
China (or Vietnam). Allegedly, most of those
goods came into Russia illegally, but even that
would have required assistance from various
Russian authorities and businesses. The Russian authorities claimed that the measures taken
were not directed deliberately against Chinese
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or traders from any other country. But the way
in which these measures were implemented did
damage to bilateral relations with China. There
was an angry reaction from the Chinese public
and a quiet but emphatic reaction at the official
level (a Chinese delegation was sent to Moscow to sort out the issue).6 It has been obvious
for years that the situation at the Cherkizovo
market required a legal crack-down. But once
the decision was taken to put the situation in
order, it could have been exercised in cooperation with Chinese authorities and over a period
of time, step by pre-announced step;
•	The same assessment can be applied to the sudden measures taken against the importation of
second-hand cars from Japan to the RFE. It was
also a well-established business that was killed
in a second without giving any prior notices
to the businesses at both ends, at home and in
Japan, for restructuring or accommodating to
new rules of the game;
•	Another dissonant event was the gunfire directed at a Chinese-manned trawler by a Russian
border patrol boat off the port of Nakhodka.
Some of the Chinese crew were missing after
the incident, causing an angry reaction from
the Chinese public that was widely reported on
Internet web-pages. China officially requested
an investigation of the incident.7 Again, nobody
denied that the law should be followed, but the
particular case did not justify the extreme measures that led to the deaths of Chinese crewmen.
Russia has continued to search for means of partnership with her most important neighbors in the
9

region—China and Japan, as well as with South Korea—and will definitely pursue this policy in the future under the current leadership. It is vital to secure
a favorable environment not only for economic development of the RFE itself, but also for a successful
APEC summit in 2012. In May 2009 during President
Medvedev’s stay in Khabarovsk, he made some key
statements regarding the Russian leadership’s views
on the country’s presence in the region: The Far East
was one of the key priorities in Russia’s development,
and broad public agreement was essential if Russians
wanted to preserve a united country; Russia intended
to maximize its integration into the Asia Pacific region
(APR) in various ways and institutions; the APR was
no less important for Russia than for Europe; economic
well-being of the RFE to a great extent would depend
on the health of economic ties with APR partners,
particularly with China, Korea, and Japan; there was
hope that the upcoming APEC summit in Vladivostok
would help Russia to move in that direction.8
As noted earlier, Russia plans to invest considerable money in infrastructure development in Vladivostok and Primorsky Krai. A special commission was
set up to prepare Vladivostok and the country for the
APEC summit. The head of the commission is First
Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov. But the horizon
of these plans extends far beyond 2012. For example,
the Vladivostok Airport development project aims at
increasing passenger flow from 1.1 million in 2008, to
3.5 million in 2012, and up to 10 million in 2030. The
planned Federal State University will be located on
Russkiy Island. Many projects are planned to revive
the shipbuilding and fishing industries, to develop
new machine industries (automobile assembly, for
example), to build facilities to process coal and other
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mineral resources for exports, etc. An agricultural industry is anticipated to have the potential to supply
neighbors with food products based on introduction
of imported technologies.
Interestingly, at least half the population in the RFE
considers developing ties with Japan and China as a
priority, with a minority of the population preferring
to rely on ties with European Russia. Such sentiments
do not imply separatism, but rather an authentic assessment of the RFE in the neighboring sub-region.
Apart from the need for a general mood of cooperation, the most pressing desideratum for all NEA countries, including Russia, is a solution to the problem
posed by North Korea. There is an immediate danger
in returning to the old pattern of U.S.-North Korea bilateral talks that provides some measure of economic
and political advantage to the North in exchange for
will-o'-the-wisp concessions. Russia has limited resources, if any, with which to influence developments
in this regard, but may be part of a five-party coalition
to work out a comprehensive approach to the North
Korean dilemma, which goes beyond nuclear and
missile issues.
CHINA
Russia’s relations with China, the most powerful
and important among all Russia’s neighbors in the Far
East, continues to develop, though not without some
hurdles and problems. Regarding China, the main
policy current in the thinking of today’s Russian leadership is to find opportunities for economic exchanges
and to cultivate a mood of mutual trust and cooperation. This approach assumes that construction of a
new Great Wall of Russia against China itself would
be both counterproductive and impossible.
11

In 2009 we saw new economic agreements between
the two countries, which have their political meaning
as well. Some of these deals are real (such as a longterm oil supply from Russia in exchange for Chinese
long-term loans). Others—like a natural gas deal—are
fairly firm. But regarding other long-term intergovernment agreements, while doubtless important, it remains to be seen what they can bring to both partners
in the practical world. In this regard, we should mention the Program for Cooperation between Regions of
the RFE/Eastern Siberia and China’s North-East for
2009-18, approved by Presidents Medvedev and Hu
Jintao during their meeting in New York in September
2009. The document includes 205 key joint projects to
be implemented in bordering regions of both countries.9 It did not get extensive publicity in the nationwide news media, but it has attracted critical attention
among experts. Some of the experts traditionally do
not believe in such programs, as previous ones had
not been successful; others see threats in any potential
partnering relations between Russia and China.
In fact, on Russia’s side the Program is a product
of ideas expressed by Medvedev during his trip to
Khabarovsk in May 2009. At the meeting with regional governors on cross-border cooperation with China
and Mongolia, Russia’s president informed them that
he proposed to the Chinese leadership a concept for
economic cooperation between neighboring regions
of the two countries and got a positive response from
the Chinese side.
At the meeting, Medvedev accentuated a few
points on what the country should do in the region:
move away from primitive exports of raw materials
to their processing; evaluate for possible emulation
the Chinese experience of using national currency
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in trade between transbordering regions; coordinate
at the working level with the Chinese North-Eastern
region mutual programs for economic development
in the RFE and Baikal region; and encourage investments in the RFE economy by China and other countries, with the aim of creating a favorable environment
for investments both in resource and high-technology
industries, for foreign businessmen and foreign laborers. Medvedev particularly stressed that China was
one of the most serious prospective economic partners
for Russia.
Concluding his remarks, Medvedev said it was
natural for Russia and China (and other countries
in APR) to have areas of direct competition between
them. But despite that, what should always be kept
in mind, according to Medvedev, was that Russia
and China were close strategic partners, and that this
status should encourage bilateral relations built on
coordination and mutual benefit in order to develop
amicable cooperation in all directions.10 To sum up,
according to Russia’s leadership assessment, bilateral
relations with China represent a challenge to use all
existing opportunities for economic development in
the Eastern part of Russia. What usually is not said
openly but definitely kept in mind, is that it should
be done without undermining Russian federal control
over the region.
Although Russia-China relations have improved
significantly both politically and economically, there
are still sensitive areas in bilateral relations. It is a
well-known fact that there are different views on
China in Russia. China’s rising economic and military
might, as well as China’s new assertiveness in world
affairs, increase the number of those who express concern over China’s future policies in general, and in
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relations with Russia in particular. In addition to those
of the anti-Chinese school of thought, more moderate
experts have also recently shown less enthusiasm and
more caution regarding the development of RussiaChina bilateral relations.
There are definitely some sensitive issues and areas in bilateral relations that require attention. Since
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia and
China have resolved their territorial issues, signed a
bilateral peace treaty, exercised bilateral leadership in
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and
developed political coordination in many other areas
of world affairs, but mutual trust between two countries has not reached a level of robustness sufficient
to exclude areas of concern and fears of a future bilateral entanglement. Of course, old prejudices (some
of them cultural) are still around or even rejuvenated
with China’s rising might, but there are deeper concerns with changing balances in favor of China in
economic and conventional armed might. Illegal migration, though its size usually is overstated, is also a
persistent serious concern.
There is rising fear of China’s dominance, of China’s iron fist in a velvet glove, of a rising China’s assertiveness in dealing with various countries. Some
experts in Russia and overseas believe that Russia is
losing in its relations with China every day, and that
bilateral relations are gradually coalescing in China’s
favor. Who is the “younger brother” in bilateral relations? Are Russia and China truly equal partners?
Such strategic issues are discussed quite frequently
within the Russian expert commentariat as it becomes
ever more visible that China’s might is on the rise, and
China’s role in world affairs will be objectively more
imposing than that of Russia.
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An inescapable issue of concern, as we have noted
earlier, is Russia’s becoming more and more a mineral and energy warehouse for China’s economy.
The acuteness of this issue will diminish if bilateral
economic relations become more diversified and balanced. Of course, there are those waiting (with fingers
crossed) for China’s economic and financial “bubble”
to burst, as well as others waiting for the American
economy to go into free fall, starting with a collapse of
the U.S. dollar.
China’s threat ideology also has its roots in a conflict between values: those who criticize Russia’s policy toward its relations with China advocate for Western values in Russia and are fierce opponents of the
current “tandem regime” in the country.11 The surge
in Chinese military spending over the past 2 decades
is already reflected in the Chinese People’s Liberation
Army’s (PLA) more assertive stance, growing capabilities, and expanded global reach. Chinese authorities repeatedly claim that the only purpose of China’s
military strength is to safeguard China’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity (the latter, in fact, speaks to
the possibility of attacking Taiwan, though it is difficult to imagine any such action at least in near future).
From time to time, we may hear in Russia direct
or indirect utterances about possible dangers for Russia from China’s rising military might. These dangers,
it is said, are aggravated by at least two facts: a long
border between the two countries, and vast unpopulated areas on Russia’s side of the border. The irony of
the issue is that Russia has supplied China with a host
of modern weapons until very recently. On the other
side, the Chinese appetite for hard goods has been of
great assistance to some Russian industries, military
aircraft factories, for example, in suriviving during

15

hard times in 1990s and at the beginning of the new
century.
It has been naïve to expect this pattern of military
cooperation to continue forever: with the increase
of its industrial, financial, and technological might,
China has relied more and more on its own capabilities. In some cases, China has sought to obtain more
sophisticated technologies than Russia can offer. In
some cases, Russia does not have such weapons and
in others, it does not want to export them for reasons
of national security.
It was reported that China made replicas of some
Russian weaponry without permission (it is a widespread practice for Chinese military and civilian producers). Whether it affected military cooperation has
not been publicly disclosed—this is quite understandable as it touches a very sensitive area of bilateral relations. Of course, in some instances China is merely imitating the Soviet Union, which applied a lot of shady
effort to get access to Western technologies. For some
reason, military-technical cooperation is diminishing,
and Russia is turning its attention in weapons exports
toward Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries,
while trying to maintain the present level of cooperation with such an old partner in this field, India.
In recent years, the PLA has conducted several
large-scale military exercises. According to the Russian anti-Chinese propagandists, the only target of
those military drills is territory of the Russian Federation (China has a history of territorial conflicts with India and Vietnam, not to mention Taiwan). When Russian strategic bombers started (after regaining access
to fuel) long-distance training flights in 2007, it did not
mean that they were going to attack the United States
or any other country. But we heard a lot of unfounded

16

fuss about the issue in Western news media and even
from military experts.
These experts have increasingly invoked the narrative of a Chinese military threat in Russia’s news
media.12 Some of them oppose the current military
reform in Russia, which aims to reduce conventional
land forces (while, at least in theory, increasing their
combat readiness). The Chinese military “threat” is a
strong argument in favor of retaining supposed excess conventional land forces in the Russian army. Of
course, Russia’s military planners and political leadership must obviously take into account the military
capabilities of other countries, but they should take
carefully calculated, efficient, and less expensive countermeasures against real threats, particularly when
the country is facing the huge task of modernizing the
civilian economy so as to improve substantially the
living standard of its population.
One of the best ways to build mutual trust between
nations in the military field is joint military exercises,
e.g., bilateral or multilateral exercises in the framework of the SCO, which Russia and China have indeed begun to conduct in recent years. SCO provides
an important area of cooperation between the two
countries. Central Asia is a region where Russia and
China have common interests, particularly security interests but economic ones as well. After China started
to obtain oil and natural gas supplies from the region,
there were voices raised in Russia that it was losing
its influence in Central Asia. But it was unrealistic
to think that Russia could control all energy exports
from newly independent states with their own national interests. Russia and China have been able thus far
to avoid geopolitical competition for influence in this
region. Yet traditional economic competition between
the two cannot be ruled out.
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Russia’s relations with the United States in the Asia
Pacific, and in NEA in particular, get little attention in
both countries, and, in fact, this issue has only limited application. But Russia pays more than passing
attention to U.S.-China relations, though China-Japan
relations have no less interesting implications for Russia since both leading Asian economic powers increasingly rub elbows in the regional economic arena.
The Russia-China-U.S. triangle is, so to speak, still
underdeveloped. Russian defense experts and politicians occasionally express concerns over such ideas as
G-2 (a proposed informal special relationship between
the United States and China) and Chimerica (a Texas corporation specifically focused to trade between
China and the Americas), etc. But most of them do
not believe that these forms of “alliance” are viable.
Russia-China relations continue to represent a combination of cooperation and friction in bilateral ties,
and a combination of policy coordination (on some issues in the international affairs) and competition (in
various regions in the world). The critical question is,
Can we just shrug off the so-called Chinese threat to
Russia? Taking into account that the question is quite
widespread within the political and economic elites,
among experts on international affairs and the world
economy, and among many “mainstreet” Russians,
the answer is that it is impossible to shrug off the
question. But the great interest in the question should
encourage both countries to make every effort to build
a bridge of genuine cooperation and to win mutual
trust on both sides.
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RUSSIA’S RELATIONS WITH JAPAN
In Russia, attitudes toward Japan and its cultural,
economic, and technological achievements are generally favorable. However, reaching a level of mutual
trust in Russia-Japan relations remains a work in progress. There is no perception of a Japanese threat—but
the territorial issue continues to spoil an atmosphere
conducive to warm bilateral relations. Fortunately, it
has not prevented the two countries from bolstering
their ties in recent years, even to having military exchanges, particularly at the regional level. Before the
current global economic and financial crisis erupted,
trade volume between the two neighbors was rising.
This trend has been interrupted by the crisis, but when
current economic problems are sorted out in one way
or another, there is a good chance that trade between
Russia and Japan will start to rise again.
An expansion of economic interaction between
the two countries would help to improve political relations, or at least to smooth the sharp edge of disagreement. There were active contacts at the highest
political level in 2009 between President Medvedev
and Japanese Prime Ministers Taro Aso and Yukio
Hatoyama. In the economic field, a new impulse to
bilateral cooperation was triggered by Prime Minister Putin’s visit to Tokyo in May 2009. It was thus a
notable breakthrough when, after 2 years of negotiations, Toshiba Corporation signed a memorandum of
understanding with Techsnabexport (a part of Atemoenergoprom, which supervises the Russian civilian
nuclear power generation business). Their nuclear energy cooperation agreement is expected to be a great
boon to firms like Toshiba that are seeking new inter-
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national markets for their atomic power technology,
as well as ensuring Japan a steady supply of enriched
uranium for its own electric generation plants. Russia will provide enriched uranium to Japan’s nuclear
plants at a low price. Japanese firms that are world
leaders in advanced nuclear technologies will in turn
be able to expand their presence in Russia and help
the country modernize its atomic facilities.13 The
agreement signals a new level of cooperation between
the two countries, as nuclear energy is a commodity of
great moment and sensitivity.
Talks in Tokyo also produced a mutual legal assistance treaty, a customs mutual assistance agreement,
and a memorandum of cooperation in preventing the
export of illegal fish catches. Earlier, the huge LNG
plant had come on stream on Sakhalin Island, with the
subsequent shipments of LNG to Japan being the fruit
of energy cooperation between the two countries. It
was followed later by the first oil supplies from the
RFE to Japan. There are plans for more energy investment projects in the RFE and Eastern Siberia for Japanese companies to share. They also can expand their
participation in modernizing Russia’s machinery and
equipment industries. Other areas of cooperation are
under consideration: information technology and telecommunication industries, transport, outer space, and
nanotechnologies.
A new sign of the political thaw between Russia
and Japan was demonstrated in January 2010 on the
occasion of the golden anniversary of the JapaneseU.S. security treaty. This time it got relatively little
attention in Russia, particularly as to the Soviet era
which spawned the treaty. There are Russians who
would—however unwisely—welcome difficulties in
U.S.-Japan relations, but, generally, vestiges of Soviet
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antipathy to a U.S.-Japanese partnership have disappeared. The main concern for Moscow in Northeast
Asia is preserving a stable environment for economic
development. The only issue in Japan-U.S. cooperation which may be of particular interest for Russia, is
ballistic missile defense. According to Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov, Russia wants to better understand
how joint Japan-U.S. plans for developing ballistic
missile defense (BMD) will affect strategic stability in
this very important part of the world.14 Presumably,
that means it will have an impact not only on the Russia-U.S. strategic balance, but will also have implications for relations between Japan and China.
So far as relations between Russia and Japan are
concerned, there is, of course, the perennial issue of
the Kuril Islands. Whenever there is a change of government in Japan or in Russia, we see renewed attention to the issue of the South Kuril Islands (or Northern Territories in the Japanese lexicon). In 2009 Japan’s
Diet passed a resolution alluding to the Northern Territories as an integral part of Japan. The resolution
changed nothing in Japan’s long-standing position on
the South Kurils, but it offered an excuse for so-called
“patriotic forces” in Russia to raise another round of
fuss on the issue. Some of these “patriots” have even
claimed that Japan may use military force to regain
the island under some circumstances. Such paranoia might be the result of two influences—a general
mood (Russia is surrounded by enemies) and a lack of
knowledge about Japan.
The Japanese side has repeated many times its readiness to react positively to Russia’s desire to develop
the RFE and Eastern Siberia and to be integrated into
the Asia Pacific region, but it usually adds the qualification that it is important to remove the last obstacle to
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bilateral cooperation—to resolve territorial issues on
Japanese terms, of course.15 Commenting on the result
of negotiations between Putin and Aso in May 2009, a
Japan Times editorial stated: “It is imperative that Japan work out a strategy to utilize expanded bilateral
cooperation in various fields including economics,
energy, and technological innovation as leverage toward deepening mutual trust and solving the territorial disputes.”16 From time to time, Japan thinks that
it can use Russia’s weakness to resolve the territorial
dispute on Japan’s terms. Japan did not understand
why, in April 1991 and after August 1991, Gorbachev
could not move on the issue without agreement with
Yeltsin. Japan also did not understand Russia’s attitude later. For example, there were public intimations
in 2008 that “Russia was facing economic difficulties
concurrently with its territorial dispute with Georgia,
and that it was being driven into a corner by its European neighbors.”17 Japan’s surmise that Russia would
therefore soften its position on the territorial issue had
no justification at all.
Truthfully, Russia is in no hurry to resolve the issue on the Japanese terms. There are conservative
forces on Japan’s side as well that firmly stand against
any compromise with Russia. Another emerging factor should be taken into account—a new political situation in Russia. In October 2004, it was possible for
President Putin to make his quiet concessions to China
over their territorial dispute involving the Tarabarov
and Bolshoi Ussuriysky Islands. But it would be
much more difficult today for President Medvedev
and Prime Minister Putin to make concessions over
the Kurils to Japan. Even if they wanted to do it, the
present flux in the domestic political situation would
make it extremely difficult. Generally, Russia and Ja-
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pan have the potential to develop strong bilateral ties
in various fields and to cooperate on regional issues,
but the territorial issue has the countervailing potential to worsen even the most promising environment
for bilateral relations in the future.
RUSSIA AND THE SITUATION ON THE
KOREAN PENINSULA
In 2010 Russia and South Korea celebrate the 20th
anniversary of their diplomatic relations established
during the last days of the Soviet Union. Since then,
both countries have developed rather intensive economic, political, and cultural relations. They have no
serious problems to deal with between them, except
for North Korea. Once there was hope that North Korea could initiate fundamental economic reform following the examples of China or Vietnam, or choose
its own way to transform, even if slowly, its economic
and political regime. That would allow for Russia and
South Korea to develop new forms of economic cooperation, to launch new projects engaging North Korea,
and to use its territory for construction of transport
facilities (railway, pipelines) to connect Russia with
South Korea by land. It did not happen, and Russia’s
ties with North Korea, along with Russia’s influence
(if any) on North Korean domestic or foreign policy,
remain very limited.
Among Russian experts on Korea, there is a longestablished school of thought (the legacy of the Soviet
Union) which tends to justify North Korean foreign
policy on the ground that the North Korean leadership is forced to defend against the “threat” from the
United States. The latter is the pretext for Pyongyang’s
desire for direct talks with Washington. But North Ko-
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rean defenders of this school expressed at the same
time disappointment over the interruption (or termination) of the Six-Party talks on North Korea.
It seems that Russia’s policy toward North Korea
currently faces two problems: first, Russian foreign
policy relations with North Korea do not currently
enjoy a high priority; and second, North Korea is not
a natural ally but rather quite an unpleasant one inherited from the days of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR). This “ally feeling” is mostly psychological, as Russia’s economic and political ties with
North Korea are, in fact, extremely limited. China has
become the main North Korean financial and political
sponsor, though Beijing is also unhappy with North
Korean behavior.
The difference between Russia and China in regards to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) may be illustrated by the following considerations. It is China, not Russia, that provides North
Korea the huge financial assistance necessary for the
regime to survive. That is why Moscow has lost all
leverage to influence Pyongyang’s decisions. In 2009,
high officials from Russia and China visited Pyongyang. Kim Jong Il had meetings with both Premier
Wen Jiabao (October) and Chinese Defense Minister
Liang Guanglie (November), but the Dear Leader
did not find time to receive Foreign Minister Lavrov
(April) and Chairman of the Upper Chamber of the
Russian Parliament Seergei Mironov (December). Presumably, the North Korean leader does not see any
reason to meet high Russian officials. It would not
be an exaggeration to say that contacts between high
Russian and North Korean officials at the moment
have no substance and would be a waste of time. In
the Russian officials’ nonmeetings with Kim Jong Il,
Russia was only losing face. Yoichi Funabashi, a well24

known Japanese security expert on East Asia, was
right in his comment on Lavrov’s visit to Pyongyang
in April 2009: “The two countries used to be allies, but
now they are neither friends nor foes.”18
But today, perhaps “foes” is not an inapt description. Consider Russia’s actions in the lead-up to North
Korea’s recent nuclear test and associated missile
launches. According to official reports, during a telephone conversation between President Medvedev
and Japan’s Prime Minister Aso, both sides agreed
that North Korean actions “represent a challenge to
international security.”19 In connection with North
Korean missile testing, Russia’s military authorities
acknowledged for the first time that they did monitor
North Korean missile launches. There are also plans
to move S-400 Triumf air defense systems to defend
Primorsky Krai in case North Korean missiles fly off
course towards Russian territory in the future.20
Currently, international efforts to bring North
Koreans back into Six-party talks are led by China
and the United States. We know that Pyongyang
wants talks on a peace treaty with the United States
and demands that sanctions be lifted before it returns
to the Six-party forum. But there is no justification
to end sanctions at this stage, taking into account
North Korean behavior and its previous strategy
of blackmailing the international community to
get concessions in return for empty promises. The
international community does not even know for sure
whether North Korea tested a nuclear device on May
25, 2009.
The threat of proliferation (technology, parts, and
materials), state of safety at North Korea nuclear facilities, and errant missile launchings with particular
danger for neighbors, including Russia, are of great in-
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ternational concern. But there are even more important
security issues than North Korea’s nuclear and missile
programs, i.e., the ����������������������������������
threat posed by a North Korean regime collapse. Recent decisions to devalue the North
Korean won and to prohibit hard currency circulation
within the country reveal much to those who endured
Gorbachev’s economic decisions in 1990-91, with the
Soviet Union on the verge of disintegration. In North
Korea, the same road to economic and state collapse
can be observed. The currency decisions have been reversed for the most part by the North Korean leadership, but a sense of intensifying domestic desperation
and uncertainty has not abated.
Not only South Korea and the United States should
prepare relevant emergency plans. China, as a main
sponsor for the Pyongyang regime’s survival thus far,
has all the justification it needs to fear a collapse of
North Korea as a state, particularly taking into account
the long border between the two countries. China obviously has a plan on how to react in case of a deteriorating situation in that neighboring country. Russia
should also be prepared for untoward developments
in North Korea. Unfortunately, we do not yet have
real cooperation among the five convening parties of
the Six-party talks on the issue of a possible collapse
of North Korea.21 So far, the five partners have not succeeded in using this format as a stepping stone to an
agenda for talks on the more comprehensive issues of
regional security (i.e., other than denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula) without waiting for North Korea to return.
The recent global financial crisis, which remains
with us even though many economies have started to
show some improvements, draws particular attention
to the role of East Asia in the future world economy.
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It further encourages Russia to develop economic ties
with its neighbors in NEA. And the uncertain situation
on the Korean Peninsula requires us to make every effort to ensure a secure environment in the sub-region.
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CHAPTER 2
RUSSIA IN EAST ASIA:
ASPIRATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
R. Craig Nation
RUSSIA AS AN ASIAN POWER
Russia’s status as an Asian power dates to the
Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, the first formal treaty
ever concluded between China and a European state.
The agreement brought an end to a series of RussianManchu border conflicts, and served to establish mutually recognized boundaries in the border area and
to quell armed clashes between the two states along
the Amur River. Nerchinsk made official the Russian
surrender of claims to the Amur region, which Russia
would not reenter for nearly 200 years.1 The Russians
were overmatched by Chinese military power in the
east, and, indeed, at the site of the Nerchinsk negotiations, where the Chinese delegation arrived with
an armed retinue of over 20,000 compared to a modest Russian contingent of about 1,500, an imbalance
sufficient to weigh upon the outcome.2 However, the
tsar’s negotiators were primarily motivated by what
the Jesuit translator at the proceedings called a “spirit
of commerce,” aiming to tap into the benefits of economic cooperation with what was perceived as a land
of fabulous wealth.3 In addition to its territorial provisions, the treaty laid down a series of regulations for
the conduct of trade and commerce with the stated
goal of “settling the bounds of the two countries of
China and Russia . . . to establish an everlasting peace
and good understanding.”4

29

The Nerchinsk treaty did not put a stop to gradual
Russian movement toward the Pacific, which, through
the 18th century, was led by settlements in the Amur
River watershed, accompanied by the establishment
of naval outposts outside the control of a weak Chinese central government. In the 19th century, in concert with other European great powers preying upon
China’s declining Qing dynasty, undisguised imperial
expansion took hold. The Nerchinsk agreement was
reversed by the Treaty of Aigun and Convention of
Peking in 1858 and 1860, which transferred the territories between the Stanovoi Mountains and Amur River
and parts of Outer Manchuria, including much of the
modern Russian Maritime Province (Primorskii Krai),
to Russia. These “unequal treaties” would become a
source of grievance between a succession of governments in Moscow and Beijing.
The immediate consequence of Russian territorial expansion was a clash of contending Russian and
Japanese imperialisms in Manchuria and Korea that
culminated in Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-05. In the Treaty of Portsmouth, which
concluded the conflict, Russia recognized Korea as
part of a Japanese sphere of influence, agreed to the
evacuation of Manchuria, and ceded to Japan its Port
Arthur naval base and the southern half of Sakhalin
Island.5 The rise of Japan posed a serious threat to
China without in any way moderating Sino-Russian
rivalry. From 1917 onward, Soviet Russia inherited
contentious relationships, including intractable territorial conflicts, with the two major East Asian powers.
Soviet policy toward East Asia was not able to
overcome what were essentially classic geopolitical
clashes of interest. The Soviets’ Manchurian Strategic
Offensive in August 1945 occasioned the conquest
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of Inner Mongolia, northern Korea, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands, but Moscow was excluded
from the U.S.-managed Japanese peace settlement.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) did
not sign the Treaty of San Francisco in 1951, formally
ending World War II in Asia, and, as result, a state
of war still technically exists between Japan and the
Russian Federation. Throughout the 1950s, Japan was
integrated into the U.S. Cold War containment front
in Asia. Resolution of the Korean question was stymied by the ambiguous outcome of the Korean War
(1950-53), which left the peninsula’s 38th parallel a focal point of Cold War confrontation. During the Chinese Civil war, despite the long-standing relationship
between the Soviet Union and Chinese Communist
Party, Joseph Stalin continued to recognize the nationalist government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and
the Guomintang right up to the moment of their flight
to Taiwan in December 1949.
The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance
concluded on February 14, 1950, seemed to create a
unified communist bloc across the heartland of Eurasia, but, in fact, only served to paper over deeplyrooted animosities. By the early 1960s, Moscow and
Beijing had become public rivals, and, in March 1969,
Soviet and Chinese forces clashed in a series of armed
confrontations on the Ussuri River.6 By 1973, 45 Soviet
divisions were deployed in a newly constituted Central Asian military district, supported by a six-fold increase in the number of tactical aircraft in theater and
significant upgrading of nuclear forces. Soviet aspirations toward a dominant or hegemonic role in East
Asian affairs, like Russian aspirations before them,
were thwarted by resistance on the part of the major
regional powers, supported by the Soviets’ American
rival.
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An important source of the reform movement
launched by Mikhail Gorbachev from 1985 onward
was the realization that Soviet aspirations exceeded
the state’s real possibilities, and that international ambitions would have to give way to a concentration on
domestic reform. In East Asia, this meant an effort to
move beyond regional polarization that left the USSR
the odd person out. Gorbachev outlined his agenda
for Asia in a major speech delivered in Vladivostok,
Russia, on July 28, 1986. Noting that the majority of
Soviet territory lay in Asia and that Moscow wished to
be fully involved in the “renaissance of world history”
occurring on the Pacific Rim, he put forward a hopeful
program for development in Siberia and the Russian
Far East (RFE) and positive engagement in the AsiaPacific.7 The first priority was normalizing relations
with China, where coming to closure on border demarcation and the demilitarization of border areas became important priorities. In April 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev became the first Russian or Soviet head of state
ever to pay a state visit to Tokyo. Though dialogue
with Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu proved
difficult, a joint communiqué announced a commitment to work on resolving outstanding differences.8
Despite the pro-Western foreign policy orientation
of the new Russian Federation under President Boris Yeltsin, the dynamic of rapprochement with Asia
launched by Gorbachev was sustained. One scholar
describes the evolution of relations under Yeltsin as
“arguably Russia’s most substantive foreign policy
success story in its first decade.”9 A 1992 border agreement successfully regularized the status of most of
the 4,200 kilometer-long eastern sector of the RussoChinese border. The April 1996 Shanghai Agreement
created the “Shanghai Five” grouping (Russia, China,
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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) and fixed
the Chinese border with the new independent states
of post-Soviet Central Asia. In 2001, the Sino-Russian
relationship was institutionalized with the creation
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).10
The government of Vladimir Putin sought to build on
these achievements, anchoring Russia’s new position
in Asia upon an energy strategy including visions of
an East Asian Energy Community (EAEC), the search
for common ground with major regional powers, and
cultivation of an elite consensus that “highlighted the
need for Russia to develop the RFE, fully integrate
itself into East Asia, and utilize its comparative advantage in energy resources and military-technological edge as foreign policy instruments for projecting
economic and political influence.”11 In an ironic sense,
the priorities motivating Russian policy seem to have
reverted to what they were at the time of the Treaty
of Nerchinsk in the 17th century—strategic restraint
in the face of stronger regional rivals accompanied
by political rapprochement and an aggressive commercial policy seeking to promote mutual economic
advantage.
Modern Russia has been engaged in Asia throughout all of its national existence. There is an identityfocused school that seeks to define Russia as a distinctive Eurasian or “intercivilizational” polity ordained
to play a special role as bridge between East and West,
but such views are not required to justify or explain
the Asian vector of contemporary Russian foreign and
security policy.12 Russia is a part of a larger Western
civilization, but the state has been and will remain an
Asian power by virtue of geographical propinquity
and the complex of interests to which it gives rise. Considerable “good advice” has been offered by Western
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commentators, urging Russia to turn its back on its
Siberian and Far Eastern frontiers so as to concentrate
on the European Russian heartland, but it is not likely
to be heeded.13 The 1997 Russian National Security Concept merely acknowledges geographical reality when
it terms Russia an “influential European-Asian power
with national interests in Europe, the Near East, Central and South Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region.”14
The Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2008 uses the
term “Eurasian power” without qualification.15 Putin
has put a practical spin on the argument, asserting
that “a significant part of Russian territory is in Asia
. . . it is not heavily populated but the resources there
are huge, and if we are talking about the speed with
which the Asia Pacific region is developing then of
course Russia should use its advantages in Asia, its
Asian roots so to speak, in order to integrate into this
economic space.”16 In these terms, an Asian vector is
not a choice for Russian foreign policy, not an existential or strategic alternative to an orientation toward
the West, but rather a promising, pragmatic, and positive necessity.
RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN ASIA
Russian policy toward the Asia-Pacific region is a
function of the role that the state can aspire to play
in the 21st century geopolitical environment. That
role is presently defined by relative weakness and
exposure. During the 1990s, independent Russia suffered through a historically unprecedented national
collapse. Under Vladimir Putin, an impressive revival took hold, but its achievements remain fragile.
The new Russia has lost the status of global power,
is struggling with the dilemmas of domestic transi-
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tion, continues to battle with a home-grown Islamic
insurgency, and confronts assertive and dangerous international rivals (i.e., a Western security community
encroaching upon traditional Russian areas of influence, and an ever more powerful China) from a position of disadvantage. Without abandoning the aspiration to reestablish the foundations of national power
and reassume a leadership role, it has no real choice
but to focus on domestic consolidation, economic development, and national revival. The spirit of current
Russian policy is reminiscent of the direction urged
by foreign minister Aleksandr Gorchakov after defeat
in the Crimean War in 1856, consisting of recueillement
(introversion)—keeping free as much as possible from
international over-extension and risk in order to pursue domestic reform, and “concentration on internal
issues and the flexible international coalitions required
for providing the nation with the necessary external
calm.”17 Normalizing relations with important regional
partners, in Asia and elsewhere, has been, and is likely
to remain, an overarching priority.
If the Russian Federation could contemplate the
reasonable prospect of association with the Western
security community on a basis of equality and mutual
respect, its approach to the East Asian region might
be somewhat more inflected. But no such prospect
is in the cards. NATO seeks improved relations with
Moscow through the limited instrumentality of the
NATO-Russia Council. European policy has been inconsistent and on occasion disoriented, while, until
recently, the United States has been alternately hostile
or indifferent. Russia’s proposal for a new European
security architecture that would incorporate multilateral forums such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the SCO, and the Collective Security
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Treaty Organization (CSTO) in a new, treaty-based
framework might provide an alternative pattern of association, but it has received a lukewarm reception.18
Speaking in Paris, France, in January 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appeared to reject the
initiative tout court, asserting that common goals “are
best pursued in the context of existing institutions.”19
Russia lacks the critical mass to pursue a balancing
strategy in Asia directed against the West. It does not
wish to subordinate itself to a rising China in some
kind of “alignment with Asia born of disillusionment
with the West.”20 But it is in a position to use association with Asian powers as a source of leverage and
advantage. The Asia-Pacific region as a whole, and
particularly the East Asian complex of China, Japan,
and the Koreas, has therefore become an increasingly
important area of engagement for Russian foreign and
security policy.21 The circumstances of engagement
point toward a pragmatic, interest-based policy of
benign interaction with a dynamic region that is not
tightly bound into multilateral forums from which the
Russian Federation has been excluded, resting rather
on what former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
described as a “commonality of the long-term strategic interests.”22
What are Russian interests in East Asia? For purposes of analysis, they may briefly be summarized in
several interrelated issue areas.
•	To sustain, build, and maintain friendly relations with China as an economic and strategic
partner in order to neutralize the threats associated with China’s development and the imbalance of power that it is creating.
• To maintain stability on Russia’s Asian frontier,
and to draw advantage from association with a
dynamic economic power.
36

•	To normalize relations with Japan, including a
compromise solution to the Kuril Islands territorial dispute and conclusion of a peace treaty,
and develop economic cooperation to stimulate
Russia’s economic reemergence.
•	To remain a partner in international efforts to
resolve the crisis of order on the Korean peninsula.
•	To pursue the redevelopment of Eastern Siberia and the RFE.
•	To maintain Russia’s status as a regional power
whose views are solicited and respected, including association with the most important
Asia-Pacific multilateral forums (the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN],
Economic Community and Regional Forum,
the East Asian Economic Community, etc.).
•	To assert its identity as an Asian power by developing an effective Asian policy as a complement (but not alternative) to engagement with
Russia’s other major international partners.
The emphasis is placed upon the practical pursuit
of national interests, not upon Asia as an alternative
field of engagement with respect to other poles of
global power. The goals are limited and certainly not
unrealistic, but they will not be easy to pursue successfully.
RUSSIA AND CHINA
Strategic alignment between Russia and China has
been a constant from Gorbachev’s perestroika initiatives
to the present, reflecting a relationship that has taken
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on its own momentum and rationale and become “a
fact of international life.”23 It is a robust relationship,
defined since 1996 as a “strategic partnership,” resting upon strong vested interests on both sides.24 The
2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Good Neighborliness and
Friendly Cooperation provides a legal foundation,
and includes commitments to expanded military cooperation, a no first use of nuclear weapons pledge
(such as Russia refuses to make in its relations with
NATO), and assertion of respect for “national unity
and territorial integrity” including specific reference
to Taiwan as an inalienable part of China.25
There is a clear convergence of world-views, perhaps most coherently expressed in the Joint Statement
on 21st World Order issued in 2005 on the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in Asia and founding
of the United Nations (UN).26 This includes a commitment to the “universally recognized principles
and norms of international law” embodied by the
UN, and the premises of respect for sovereignty and
nonintervention.27 Scholars and policymakers reiterate, in direct opposition to purported U.S. intentions,
that “for Russia and China, it is of the greatest importance to bring into being a multi-polar world order,
where policies of containment and power balancing
will be eliminated.”28 Beijing and Moscow are aligned
in opposing separatism in disputed regions such as
Kosovo, Chechnya, Xinjiang, and Tibet. NATO’s war
against Serbia in 1999 provided a particular impetus
to strategic cooperation. Moscow was concerned by
the Alliance’s demonstration of capacity to wage war
with decisive effect on the Russian periphery. China
was offended by the bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade, interpreted not as an error, but as an admonition.29 The creation of the SCO followed in short
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order, and in 2005 the first-ever joint Sino-Russian
military exercise, Peace Mission 2005, was staged in
China’s Shandong province.30 Subsequent Peace Missions 2007 and 2009, ostensibly organized as anti-terrorist drills, were, in fact, pointed demonstrations of a
capacity to intervene militarily against U.S. interests
in post-Soviet Central Asia, the Korean peninsula, or
beyond.31 Collaboration in foreign and military intelligence has been ongoing from the early 1990s. Both
sides have expressed opposition to U.S., Japanese,
and Republic of Korea missile defense systems in the
Pacific theater.32 They resist Western discourse on human rights and the obligation to protect democracy
as a pretext for intervention and domination, express
concern over the projection of Western power into areas of their traditional influence, and oppose the dynamic of NATO enlargement. Given overwhelming
U.S. military capacity and determination to play a proactive role in the Asia-Pacific theater, Russia-Chinese
military collaboration has a strong structural logic.
Economic complementarities are another motivation. In the 1990s, Russia was the only willing supplier of the kind of sophisticated military equipment
that China desired and needed to modernize its force,
including advanced submarines, fighters, destroyers,
missile systems, and strategic lift aircraft. Arms transfers to China represented 42 percent of the total value
of Russian arms sales from 1997 to 2007. Though arms
transfers have leveled off from 2007 onward as China
has come to produce more of its own equipment on
license, Russia remains China’s largest national supplier.33 Expanding joint military research and development benefits both sides. Trade and investment
have increased rapidly. Bilateral trade volume has
risen from only several billion dollars at the time of
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the Soviet collapse to near $60 billion in 2009, and
China is now Russia’s third largest trade partner (Russia is China’s ninth largest export market, accounting
for less than 2 percent of total exports). Russia is the
world’s second largest oil producer (after Saudi Arabia) and China the second largest oil consumer (after
the United States). The Chinese demand for oil is expected to double to something near 14 billion barrels
per day by 2025, and large-scale oil and natural gas
projects, including the East Siberian Pacific Ocean
Pipeline (ESPO) for which construction is now underway, continue to expand.34 China currently imports
nearly 80 percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf, on
open waterways that could be cut off at the Straits of
Hormuz or Malacca in case of a regional crisis in the
Middle East or blowup over Taiwan. Expanded access
to Russian resources will diversify Chinese supply
and make it more secure from disruption. On a political level, the SCO provides a framework for regional
cooperation and cultural dialogue, a means to regulate Russian and Chinese engagement in the “shared
neighborhood” of Inner Asia, and a useful forum for
addressing energy security issues.35 In general, and for
obvious reasons, Russia seeks increased participation
in East Asian political, security, and economic dynamics.36
Alignment with China brings Russia a meaningful
source of trade and capital investment opportunity;
markets for military technology and expertise as well
as oil and natural gas; a strategic and ideological ally
against an American “hegemonic” world order and
U.S. encroachment in post-Soviet Central and Inner
Asia; stable relations with its increasingly powerful
East Asian neighbor; and a framework for the kind of
regional stability that Moscow needs if its agenda for
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national reassertion is to move forward. China obtains
guaranteed supplies of oil and natural gas; diplomatic
support in international forums, including the UN,
on issues of concern, including the Taiwan question;
shared opposition to an expansion of U.S. power in
the Asia-Pacific region; access to military hardware
and technology and a source of modernization for
its armed forces; concert on behalf of stability and
expanded engagement in Central Asia; and leverage
in relations with India. Russian and Chinese political
leaders, as well as academic and policy analysts, place
a great deal of weight upon the relationship, and go
out of their way to accommodate mutual interests and
concerns.37
There are also clouds on the horizon. Russia’s trade
pattern with China is imbalanced, with exports consisting primarily of military equipment, timber products, strategic nonferrous metals, and hydrocarbons,
while imports range across the spectrum of commodities including manufactured goods and sophisticated
electronics. Russia could also become a food supplier
on the Chinese market in the short to medium term. If
this pattern is not altered there is a real risk of Russia’s
role being reduced, in the words of Dmitri Medvedev,
to that of “a raw material base for Asian countries.”38
Against the background of the sharp economic contraction of 2009, Chinese direct investment, as well as
lending, has increased in several sectors, including
energy infrastructure, extractive industries, and advanced technologies.39 Moscow is likewise displeased
with increasing Chinese engagement in Inner Asia
and the Caspian region, including the China-Turkmenistan natural gas pipeline (opened on December
14, 2009) and the China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline deals,
and China’s general accretion of political influence.40
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Beijing reacted to the global economic crisis in 2009,
for example, with over $10 billion in loans to struggling Central Asian partners within the SCO.41 Russia
would like to find ways to block Chinese ambitions,
but lacks convincing alternatives. China is acquiring
greater economic clout inside Russia and Central Asia,
and Russian dependence on a more dynamic Chinese
neighbor is a risk that may become unavoidable.
There are additional sources of strategic friction.
The growing demographic imbalance between China’s eastern provinces and the RFE is viewed by some
as a long-term source of creeping Sinicization, with
some analysts envisioning an eventual military threat
should long-term trends advantaging China continue.
Russia is concerned that as its effort to limit nuclear
weapons and delivery systems in bilateral talks with
the United States moves forward, the strategic balance
with China, upon which its entire defensive posture
in the Asia-Pacific theater rests, may erode to its disadvantage.42 China also seems more reluctant than
the Russian Federation to contribute to the nonproliferation regime by pressuring Iran and North Korea.
The extravagant idea, floated by Zbigniew Brzezinski
among others, of a U.S.-China “Group of Two” as a
forum for global management is rejected by Russian
commentators as unrealistic, but concern is nonetheless expressed over the implications of any kind of
U.S.-Chinese rapprochement.43 China and Russia are
not in full accord about future prospects for the SCO.
Russia wants it to expand, develop rapid reaction capacity, and accentuate its character as a security forum. China urges a “deepening” alternative focused
on transforming the organization into a common market and commercial union, a recipe, as viewed from
Moscow, that risks leaving Russia overwhelmed by
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Chinese economic power.44 The refusal of China, or
any other member of the SCO, to follow Russia in according recognition to South Ossetia and Abkhazia
following the Russo-Georgian War of August 2008
was revealing of the limits of alignment. Social issues
can also be troublesome. Russia’s decision to close
down Moscow’s Cherkizovskii Market, with its many
Chinese traders, in July 2008, provoked a sharp reaction, to which the Russians were quick to yield with
backtracking and concessions.45 In general, the power
balance is perceived to be moving to China’s advantage, and to Moscow’s long-term detriment.
Such concerns can easily be exaggerated. China has
problems of its own, including a considerable weight
of rural poverty, large internal regional imbalances,
a legacy of repressive authoritarian governance, the
incongruous leading role of the Communist Party, energy dependency, undervaluation of the renminbi and
the friction it generates within the global economy, the
potential for destabilizing civil unrest in the context of
ongoing modernization, separatist movements, and
the strategic challenge of Taiwan. Russian analysts
are as aware of these threats, risks, and challenges
as anyone else.46 In view of its vulnerabilities, strategic partnership with the Russian Federation works
to China’s advantage, and this calculus is not likely
to change anytime soon—what some have labeled
strategic convergence between Moscow and Beijing
is likely to become an enduring fact of international
life.47 The putative threat of Chinese military action
to reclaim territories lost to Russia is far off the radar
screen—Beijing seems to be sincerely committed to
its “peaceful development” thesis, demonstrates no
hostile intent, and lacks powerful allies or meaningful
military options.48 In the last resort, Russia’s nuclear
forces would be a more than sufficient deterrent.
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The Sino-Russian relationship should be perceived
as something more than an “axis of convenience”
plagued by “fear, anxiety, and mistrust” which is ultimately “of secondary importance.” 49 If “convenience”
is defined as the pragmatic pursuit of interests, we
have in fact arrived at the essence of statecraft. The
Sino-Russian relationship is not a sacramentally consecrated marriage. It is a practical friendship on both
sides, but as such quite substantial, resting on a foundation of mutual interests, embraced and cultivated
by both parties, and institutionalized by treaty and
within the SCO. It is likely to remain a factor of significance in the changing configuration of 21st century
world politics.
RUSSIA AND JAPAN
Russian policy documents emphasize the need
for “intensified and balanced relations with all of the
countries of the [East Asian] region.”50 The most important of these countries, after China, is Japan, with
whom Moscow aspires to build a “multi-sided partnership . . . on the basis of shared interests.” 51 Closer
ties with Japan promise economic advantage, contributions to the redevelopment of the RFE, and some
potential for balancing against Beijing. Unfortunately,
Russo-Japanese relations have been held back for decades by the absence of a formal peace agreement, unresolved territorial conflict over the status of the four
southernmost Kuril Islands (for Japan, the “Northern
Territories”), and the special relationship that has
made Japan the cornerstone of U.S. policy in East Asia.
Moscow and Tokyo restored diplomatic relations in
1956, with a joint declaration that also waived reparation claims and included a trade protocol, but the
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gesture did not lead to a compromise resolution of the
territorial dispute as was originally hoped, nor did it
change Japan’s role as the foundation for a permanent
U.S. strategic presence in Asia. During the late Soviet
period and through the Yeltsin years, as the Cold War
gradually faded, a process of normalization was begun, culminating with the 1998 Moscow Declaration
between Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Keito
Obuti enunciating a “creative partnership” and will
to compromise on the Kurils.52 The promise has not
been realized—powerful structural barriers continue
to block a fundamental transformation in the relationship.53
Several decades of economic stagnation culminated in August 2009 with the defeat in general elections
of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, the first such defeat suffered by the party in modern Japan’s 54-year
political history. The victorious center-left Democratic
Party of Japan and new Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama articulated the goal of reducing dependence upon
the United States in security affairs and pursuing a
more autonomous and Asia-focused regional policy,
including closer ties to Japan’s historical rival China,
and movement toward a European Union (EU)-style
association of East Asian states.54 Hatoyama may have
a personal stake in the outcome—his grandfather was
the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit the Soviet
Union and presided over the reestablishment of diplomatic relations in 1956, while his only son lives and
works in Moscow. He has struggled to sustain political
momentum in office, however, and has concentrated
his energies on domestic reform. Hatoyama’s policies
have the potential to expand the space for cooperation
with Russia, but to date little has been accomplished.
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Russo-Japanese trade expanded more than fourfold (from $7 to $30 billion) between 2003 and 2009,
though it remains modest in relative terms. In 2007,
the Russian market represented 1.7 percent of Japan’s
total trade turnover, while the Japanese market represented 3.5 percent of Russian trade. Exchange is
severely imbalanced. Russian exports to Japan are
dominated by raw materials—minerals and hydrocarbons (over 50 percent of the total), timber, fish, and
seafood—while Japanese exports to Russia are overwhelmingly manufactured goods, including cars, machinery, and electrical-engineering products.55 Commercial relations nonetheless provide a promising
foundation for mutually beneficial cooperation, but
expanding trade has not been accompanied by any
kind of political breakthrough.
The rhetoric of injustice concerning Japan’s Northern Territories continues to block progress on a diplomatic resolution of the Kuril Islands dispute.56 Though
the substantive issues tied up with the four islands
that constitute the Northern Territories (fishing rights,
visitations, a small number of surviving displaced
persons) are modest, the symbolic weight of the question in Japanese self-perception is significant.57 Domestic factors in Russia also come into play. The idea
of territorial concession in the Kurils is not popular
with Russia’s unhappy regional electorate and an easy
pawn for demagoguery by local politicians.
The failure to establish a more promising investment climate in the RFE (including such egregiously
offensive gestures as the forced reduction of Mitsubishi and Mitsui shares in the Sakhalin Island energy
projects) means that the potential for expanded economic interaction will continue to be constrained.
Russia’s decision, after much hesitation, to prioritize
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China as the primary destination for the ESPO, illustrates a strategic reality—Moscow has no choice but
to favor relations with Beijing over Tokyo given the
current regional balance of power.
Russia and Japan share many interests in common.
Both have democratic institutions and market economies, and rank among the world’s leading economic
powers. Except for the territorial dispute, no outstanding issues or sources of conflict divide them. During
the Cold War, the USSR was perceived as a threat, but
such views have little credence today. Cultural exchange is expanding and manifestations of Japanese
culture, including cuisine and cinema, are in vogue
among Russian elites. Russian energy resources in Siberia and the RFE and Japan’s dependence on energy
imported from Russia, including nuclear fuel supplies
and liquefied natural gas, should provide a solid basis for bilateral relations. Not least, both parties seek
counterweights against a rising China. Patient diplomacy and expanded economic ties have the potential
to generate at least a modest amelioration of relations
over time. Russian analysts generally express hope
that “economic cooperation between Russia and Japan
can be one of the most effective ways to accelerate the
conclusion of a peace treaty.”58
The strategic dimension of the relationship is
perhaps less promising. Japan’s troubled relationship with China places limits on how far Tokyo may
ultimately wish to distance itself from strategic dependency on the U.S. Japan is concerned by what it
considers China’s nonstatus quo orientation in the
Asia-Pacific region, embodied in a strategy of expansion that directly affects Japanese interests. These
interests include a claim to the greater part of the
South China Sea (with the Spratly Islands) as Chinese
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territorial waters and differences over the identification of exclusive economic zones (with access to natural gas deposits) in the East China Sea. China’s claims
are buttressed by the ongoing creation of a powerful
blue-water navy, apparently being crafted to deny the
U.S. and Japanese fleets the capability to operate freely
in the Western Pacific in the event of an armed conflict
in the Taiwan Strait.59 Taiwan itself is an important
point of contention. Japan controlled Taiwan during
the first half of the 20th century, and is a military ally
of the United States, the ultimate guarantor of the status quo between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). U.S. assets based in and around Japan
would be critical in the event of any kind of armed
conflict. China expresses strong opposition to U.S.Japanese cooperation in theater missile defense, which
it interprets as an attempt to contain China, “especially by facilitating Taiwan’s continued separation from
the Mainland.”60 Tokyo is concerned about China’s
expanding deployment of missiles fitted with nuclear
warheads—a threat that only the United States is in a
position to effectively address. The undigested legacy
of history, particularly China’s historical memory of
the Japanese invasion and occupation from 1931 onward, remains a major barrier to rapprochement. The
prospect of negotiating a “grand bargain” between
China and Japan, though intellectually appealing, is
likely to falter on the deep-seated differences that continue to divide these long-standing rivals.61
Russo-Japanese bilateral relations will be shaped
in the context of a larger four-power relationship, including both China and the United States. All of the
major East Asian powers have an interest in managing China’s inexorable rise and encouraging Beijing
to take on the role of a responsible and reliable 21st
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century world power. But Russia, Japan, and the
United States have complicated mutual dependency
relationships with Beijing that make coordinated policies, or a more ambitious concert of regional powers,
difficult to achieve.62 So long as the United States is
perceived as the preponderant East Asian power, it
is unlikely that Japan would jeopardize its security
by moving away from the special relationship with
Washington that has sustained it since World War
II, or that Russia will be in a position to break away
from the constraining, and sometimes encumbering,
embrace of its strategic partnership with Beijing. Russia will nonetheless entertain opportunities to exploit
improved relations with Japan and the United States
in order to win space for the pursuit of its own interests vis-à-vis China. Subtle strategic interaction, rather
than a dramatic “diplomatic revolution,” is likely to
define the course of East Asia’s strategic quadrilateral
for the foreseeable future.
RUSSIA AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA
Russia’s goals on the Korean peninsula are relatively straightforward but also potentially contradictory. Unlike the cases of China and Japan, it has no
major outstanding differences with either Korea, and
would like eventually to integrate the peninsula into
a zone of privileged economic interests.63 Moscow
can have no interest in condoning the emergence of
North Korea as a nuclear power, though Pyongyang’s
primitive nuclear and rocket technology is not really
threatening. Russia was a constructive participant in
the Six-Party talks seeking to head off that outcome.64
It wants to avoid military conflict, including the possibility of unilateral U.S. military action, at all costs.65
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However, Moscow also seeks to avoid being marginalized diplomatically, including loss of influence over
an eventual process of Korean unification. A supportive relationship with Pyongyang has thus been one of
the few cards it is in a position to play, though it is
not a particularly attractive option. Russia’s greatest
potential in regard to the Korean Question is its ability to play the role of spoiler—an outcome that U.S.
policy should be crafted to prevent.66 China, upon
whom Pyongyang depends for food and energy, remains the key to addressing the North Korean nuclear
challenge. Coordinated initiatives on the part of the
United States and China, should they be achieved, are
therefore the most promising mechanism for its resolution.
THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST
The choice of Vladivostok as the venue for the 2012
APEC summit has revived interest in the long-standing project to rekindle the RFE. Planning has given rise
to a flurry of construction and facility modernization.
Unfortunately, much of it is focused on grandiose prestige projects (hotels, congress halls, a new university
complex, and a tunnel and bridge attaching Russkii
Island to the peninsula), while little is being done to
improve a badly degraded urban infrastructure. Despite repeated public commitments to resurrect the
city’s fortunes, the situation remains dire—emigration is substantial, and population decline precipitous. Economic frustration provoked by an increase in
import tariffs for used cars spilled over into massive
demonstrations (over 10,000 participants) in December 2008, put down harshly by the authorities.67 Ominously, and unhelpfully, in an echo of the disastrous
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Stalinist evocation of “wreckers,” a report commissioned by the Russian State Duma placed responsibility at the feet of “foreign agents,” with the events
described as “an organized attempt to destabilize the
social situation in several Russian regions . . . conducted according to a unique scenario recalling that of
the orange revolutions . . . with the primary aim of attempting to detach the Far East from Russia.”68 Demonstrations in Vladivostok were renewed in March
2010 as part of nationwide “Days of Wrath” protests
against disintegrating economic conditions.69
The real sources of unrest in Vladivostok and the
RFE as a whole, of course, are not outside agitators
but accumulating problems resulting from malgovernance: economic neglect, deeply rooted corruption,
and the sense of abandonment born in part from the
region’s distance from the major centers of economic
and political power in contemporary Russia. President Medvedev seemed to acknowledge the reality in
an interview on the occasion of the 2009 St. Petersburg
Economic Forum, commenting that “Vladivostok is a
lovely city, but ‘beaten down’ [ubityi].”70 Addressing
these kinds of dilemmas, which the situation in Vladivostok appropriately symbolizes, is an essential foundation for an effective Russian policy in East Asia.
The RFE and Eastern Siberia are resource rich, including vast reserves of oil and natural gas, notably
on Sakhalin Island, and large potential deposits of
diamonds and precious metals in Iakutia. But they
are also, as expressed by Putin to the Russian Security
Council, “poorly linked to the economic, information,
and transportation network of the rest of Russia.”
They are “using its natural competitive advantage,
including transit corridors, very ineffectively.” This
situation “poses a serious threat to our political and
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economic positions in the Asia-Pacific region and to
Russia’s national security, without exaggeration.”71
The Russian Federation is committed to addressing
regional dilemmas, but the most optimistic thing that
can be said is that it will be a difficult and long-term
undertaking. In the meantime, the RFE will remain a
nagging source of vulnerability in Russia’s campaign
to assert itself as a respected regional power.
The most often-evoked challenge to Russian aspirations in the Far East is the purported “flood” of
Chinese immigrants said to be pouring into Russia
and about to effect a creeping annexation of the RFE.
But this picture may, in fact, be the least of Moscow’s
worries. Careful evaluations of permanent Chinese
immigration indicate that the problem is not as severe
as is sometimes claimed.72 In fact, Russia has an urgent
need for labor migrants. The key to the redevelopment
of the RFE is not isolation, but rather regional integration and broad-based economic and social reform
within the Russian Federation as a whole.
CONCLUSION: RUSSIA AS AN ASIAN POWER
Russia needs a long-term strategy to secure and
expand its position in East Asia, such as exists at present only in vague outline. The foundation can only be
an energy security relationship that makes Russia a
major supplier of oil and natural gas for the Chinese,
Japanese, and Korean markets and encourages investment on the part of these countries in Russia’s energy
infrastructure and the RFE.
On this kind of foundation, the RFE itself needs to
be reestablished as a vibrant part of the Russian national economy. The need to reconstruct local labor
markets, encourage repopulation, attack corruption,
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and restore dynamism should be self-evident. This is
a major challenge, but it has been articulated clearly
as a national priority. The effort needs to be linked
to a strategy for regional development that engages
neighbors by leveraging Russia’s soft power assets
(cultural, scientific, technological, and educational) to
shared advantage.
East Asia lacks consolidated post-Cold War security structures, and security relations in the region
are in flux. Russia will maneuver to win acknowledgment as an integral part of nascent regional security
arrangements, but it will remain a second tier player. In its current state of relative weakness, Moscow
cannot afford antagonistic relations with the leading
East Asian powers or with their most important extraregional partner, the United States. Russia will have
no choice but to define its priorities in the context of
a stable “partnership” with the PRC, pursue normal
relations with Japan, and work with the international
community, possibly within a renewed Six-power
framework, to discipline Pyongyang and eventually
bring it in from the cold.
Russia cannot be said to have “failed” in Asia because its aspirations are relatively modest. It seeks to
engage as a full partner in Asian multilateral forums
and accrue strategic leverage, economic advantage,
and legitimacy as a regional power—and has done so
with some success. It seeks a stable relationship with
China based upon mutual advantage—a relationship
that is firmly in place. It seeks to tap in to the region’s
economic dynamism, as an energy supplier and target for investment—with limited progress. It seeks
to build on economic interaction with Japan to move
toward a full normalization of political relations. It
hopes to neutralize what is often portrayed as a U.S.
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commitment to perpetuate its regional hegemony, but
this is an aspiration that it is not really in a position to
pursue effectively. A more promising course would be
to work together with Washington on behalf of shared
goals, extending the “reset” agenda to the East Asian
theater including cooperative initiatives to manage
the assertive, and potentially destabilizing, ambitions
of Beijing.
Dmitri Trenin has described contemporary Russia
as a “Euro-Pacific power with global reach” and characterized Vladivostok as “its 21st century capital.”73
This expansive evocation of a future Asian vector is
visionary, but premature. Russia’s foreign policy priorities are determined by the balance of world power.
This dictates the prioritization of domestic consolidation, democratization, and development based upon
diversification and modernization. It discourages assertive gambits and aspirations to punch above its
weight. International stability is a prerequisite for
successful domestic transformation, a fact that goes
far toward explaining the balanced texture of SinoRussian relations. Moscow can do little to break the
security ties that have bound Tokyo to Washington
in the past and are likely to continue to do so in the
future. Redevelopment of the RFE, essential to Russia’s regional aspirations, is a long-term project that
has barely begun. Russia is and will remain an Asian
power, but it will be hard pressed to pursue its interests from a position of relative weakness.
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CHAPTER 3
RUSSIAN REPOSITIONING IN
NORTHEAST ASIA:
PUTIN’S IMPACT AND CURRENT PROSPECTS
Gilbert Rozman
A persistent Russian theme since late 1992 is the
importance of strengthening Russia’s position in the
Asia-Pacific Region (focused on Northeast Asia, above
all).1 By 2010, considerable repositioning had taken
place, but there is renewed interest in going further.
This ranges from advocating putting ties with China
on a more “equal” footing, to proposing that the
Korean peninsula could catapult Russia into a special
regional role, to exploring ways to work closely with
Japan, all of which gained further attention under
Dmitry Medvedev. Looming in the background are
images of Russia’s relationship with the United States,
which give a triangular cast to these aspirations. In
this paper, I first review Vladimir Putin’s impact in
changing Russia’s regional position, then consider
each of the three geographical orientations for repositioning Russia from 2010, and finally add the context
of Russo-U.S. relations to provide a broader, globalized perspective.
Putin took office intent on rebuilding Moscow’s
clout around its borders and in the international community. China soon appeared as the most inviting
partner, sharing opposition to the existing U.S.-led
world order and determined to limit U.S. ambitions in
regard to states such as Iran and North Korea, and to
limit as well further humanitarian interventions such
as occurred in 1999 over Kosovo.2 A decade later, with
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Medvedev occupying the presidency while Putin retains considerable power as prime minister and presumed next president from 2012, positioning Moscow
between Washington and Beijing has assumed even
more importance in the midst of a spate of global and
regional summits. Adjustment of strategy would be
necessary, as Presidents Barack Obama and Medvedev tried to “reset” relations.
Russia’s aims in repositioning in Northeast Asia
are three-fold. First, there is a need to gain domestic
legitimacy by asserting state capacity and solidifying control over the seemingly vulnerable Russian
Far East (RFE).3 Second, memories of the Soviet era,
as well as the Russian Empire, push today’s leaders
to reassert hegemony, if not control, over territories
formerly under Russian control.4 Finally, traditional
balance of power reasoning dictates pursuit of partnerships directed against maximization of power by
other states, although contrasting views about U.S.
and Chinese power complicate any balancing strategy.5 In the aftermath of the global power swing of
2008-09, Russia is revisiting this strategy. It must
overcome the mindset that all of these goals can be
achieved together, resulting in such anomalies as
the view that befriending North Korea and watering
down United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions against it, even as it develops nuclear weapons,
somehow serve the cause of denuclearization and a
regional balance of power. Of utmost importance, it
must also chart a path to modernization of a Russian
top-down economy weak in entrepreneurship with its
bloated bureaucracy steeped in corruption, as it enters
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and diversifies
its exports beyond natural resource shipments to dynamic Asia.
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RUSSIAN REPOSITIONING IN NORTHEAST
ASIA, 2000-09.
Boris Yeltsin had talked about strengthening Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region since the middle of 1992, but when he left office at the end of 1999,
its situation did not appear to be any more favorable.6
His crowning achievement—the strategic partnership
he and Jiang Zemin had heralded in 1996—seemed
wobbly after trade goals went unrealized, cultural ties
proved difficult to boost, and their ineffectual coordination in response to the war over Kosovo left serious doubt even about political ties in the second half
of 1999.7 In an effort to have its voice heard over the
diplomatic din related to North Korea, Russia strove
to rebuild ties with Pyongyang, but there was still no
breakthrough at the very time South Korean President
Kim Dae-jung was revving up his Sunshine Policy to
engage Kim Jong Il and reenergize multilateral diplomacy. After bilateral relations with Seoul suffered a
jolt in 1997 with a Russian scholar’s arrest for spying
amid countercharges that South Korean intelligence
officials were behaving brazenly, and then dual financial crises sent bilateral trade plunging, Yeltsin’s summit with Kim only started to put a fresh face on relations.8 Having promised in 1997 that the “countdown
to 2000” would lead to a breakthrough in normalization with Japan, Yeltsin failed to sustain the momentum when, during his convalescence from illness in
November 1998, he briefly met Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo without a credible initiative, resulting in no
progress during his final year in office.9
Aspirations for confirmation of Russia’s renewed
status in Northeast Asia kept rising even if they
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remained unsatisfied under Yeltsin. Just as acceptance
into the G-7, now renamed the G-8, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) had only a temporary calming effect, hyperbolic talk about multipolarity appeared rather empty vis-à-vis the image of
U.S. ascendancy in the aftermath of the dual financial
crises in Asia and Russia and the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) war in opposition
to Serbia, bypassing the UN Security Council. Yet, in
the midst of intensifying anti-Americanism in Russia,
there was a strong temptation to believe in the possibility of a breakthrough in Northeast Asia. Even as
such demagogues as Governor Evgeny Nazdratenko
in Primorskii Krai railed against Chinese skullduggery, assessments of China’s intentions and its need
for closer ties with Russia tilted the balance toward
strengthening the strategic partnership.10 Foreign
Minister and briefly Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov’s assertive balance of power strategy centered on
China in 1996-99 left a popular legacy that Putin could
continue, shunting aside Yeltsin’s earlier Atlanticism.
The decade of the 2000s in Russian foreign policy can conveniently be divided into three periods.
During his shake-down first term—2000-04—Putin
struggled to find a balance between the United States
and China, as the former was regarded as looking for
closer ties and the latter as still rather weak. Through
his second term—2004-08—Putin grew increasingly
upset with the United States and came to consider
China a credible partner in limiting U.S. power. The
Medvedev/Putin tandem in 2008-09, however, saw
China as newly ascendant and the United States as in
flux, with some potential to turn to Russia to advance
various global objectives. Russian strategic thinking
fluctuated in accord with the balance of power within
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this triangle and also with assessments of Russia’s
own assets in shaping international relations. The first
period coincided with economic weakness, the second
with rising energy and natural resource prices, and
the third largely with its setback in the economic crisis that engulfed the world and drove energy prices
downward.
Dissatisfaction with the limits of Russia’s regional
strategy deepened in 2009. In 2007-08 confidence had
bordered on arrogance. There was talk of a sort of G-3,
as Russia would join the United States and China at
the pinnacle of the world, riding energy revenues to a
world rank as high as fifth in gross domestic product
(GDP) and its strategic clout to such an exalted position that its voice would be indispensable in addressing the world’s security dilemmas. Leaders in the RFE
anticipated heightened status in the region, drawing
on assistance from the presidential program for the
region as Vladivostok celebrated being selected as
APEC host in 2012 and anticipating energy abundance
after a new oil pipeline was built from Western Siberia
to a nearby terminus.11
Yet, as with prior presidential programs for the region, this one was dead on arrival. Tighter economic
circumstances after the onset of the global financial
crisis dictated the choice of the Chinese city Daqing as
the terminus, leaving faint hope that enough oil would
be available to build a second pipeline exclusively on
Russian territory. Disappointment in North Korea’s
hard line, bypassing of the Six-Party Talks, and the
rapidly shifting balance of power in favor of China,
made it easier for Medvedev to welcome a multilateralist U.S. leader—Obama—in rebuilding relations.
Despite the image of Obama-Medvedev coordination, few doubted that Putin was still the most powerful
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figure in Russia, as he continued to entertain reservations about plans under consideration. In Vladivostok
on December 28, 2009, he set unexpected conditions
on the bilateral nuclear arms talks supposedly nearing
completion, conditioning them on U.S. willingness to
drop missile defense plans, and he reaffirmed development plans for the Russian Far East, which had appeared problematic during the year 2009. His plans
called for: (1) a separate energy system, premised on
construction of the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO)
oil pipeline and the Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok gas pipeline; (2) a renewed industrial base, including shipbuilding in Primorskii Krai and civilian
aircraft construction in Komsomol’sk-na-Amure; and
(3) a Far Eastern Research Center on Russky Island in
Vladivostok, where new bridges and facilities were
being erected for the Asia-Pacific Economic Council
(APEC) summit. While other projects designated at
the peak of the energy bubble had been abandoned
and the heady optimism of local leaders had seemed
to be dashed,12 Putin insisted that despite the decision
to build a “spur” to the oil pipeline first to Daqing, the
line would be finished also to the Pacific Ocean as part
of a regional development strategy.
In 2010 there remained more questions than answers about Russia’s position in Asia. Medvedev’s
rhetoric in support of improved U.S. ties and modernization belied the policies that still seem dictated by
Putin’s legacy and his continued reluctance to change.
Chinese claims that bilateral relations were better
than ever contradicted Russian appeals for transforming them. Dashed hopes in dealing with Japan, South
Korea, and North Korea had produced years of hand
wringing but no fundamental redirection. Without a
clear decision on how to manage U.S. relations, foreign policy in Asia as in Europe is in limbo.
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PROSPECTS FOR REPOSITIONING IN
SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
Advancing Sino-Russian relations from the time
of Yeltsin’s visit to Beijing in December 1992 through
2009 draw on one fundamental reality: Both states oppose allowing U.S. power and Western values to gain
a dominant global position. Bearing in mind strong
memories of past U.S. "transgressions," they agree
that areas under their current control (Tibet, Xinjiang,
and Chechnya) must be free of U.S. pressure, and
areas that should be subject to their sovereignty or
strong influence (Taiwan, Ukraine, Georgia) must be
reclaimed from U.S. interference. The two also share a
firm commitment to leave with the UN Security Council the sole authority to address questions or the use of
force beyond one’s national borders. They assume that
their national interests will be better served by denying (through their veto) the United States and its allies this instrument of foreign policy in regard to Iran,
North Korea, Sudan, or any other weapons of mass
destruction proliferation threat or humanitarian intervention target. With Bill Clinton’s financial globalization and George W. Bush’s preemptive unilateralism
each deemed dangerous, Moscow and Beijing viewed
each other as the most helpful of all possible partners
in boosting their own state’s political clout.13 Neither
is inclined to treat Barack Obama’s multilateralism
and engagement policy as a turning point, suspecting rather that his liberal values and problem-solving
compromises still marginalize their ambitions. ChinaRussia bilateral ties also serve to let each concentrate
on its priorities with little concern about an unstable
border and to reap economic benefits with security
implications (arms sales to China, energy pipeline

69

diversification that may reduce Russian dependence
on European customers, etc.). Looking back, both
sides prize the positive results of their ties from the
mid-1990s, while they regret the negative consequences of the prolonged Sino-Soviet split.
In at least four respects, Sino-Russian relations
face new challenges in the second decade of the 21st
century that may lead Russia to grow more cautious
about this strategic partnership. First is the changing
military balance of power. Russian arms sales and
technology transfers gave a great boost to China’s
military, but as China’s power has increased with
continuing huge budget increases, Russian hesitation about arming a rival has intensified. Earlier reluctance to transfer to China weapons as advanced as
some sold to India, combined with anger over unauthorized Chinese copying of their technology, is now
joined by additional signs of Russian reservations.
As Moscow and Washington proceed in talks to limit
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, Beijing’s
unwillingness to consider any limits on its parallel, if
less numerous, assets, is a concern.14 Regarding North
Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons development, as
Moscow more actively searches for common ground
in response to Obama’s overtures, Russian awareness is growing that Beijing may not give a similar
priority to denuclearization. Russia sees its superior
nuclear destructive capacity as one of its few assets
as a great power and is tempted by U.S. efforts to halt
proliferation. But China’s own plans for increasing its
nuclear weaponization render it more resistant to U.S.
anti-proliferation pressures on North Korea and Iran.
After all, North Korea stands in the way of reunification favorable to South Korea, while Iran increasingly
contributes to Chinese energy security. Russia sees a
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unified Korea as favorable to a balance of power in
Northeast Asia and a non-nuclear Iran as a check on
extremism that could eventually destabilize Muslim
minorities in the Russian Federation.
The second difference in strategic thinking between Moscow and Beijing relates to economics and
energy. Moscow is protective of its industries and desirous of controlling energy sources on its own territory and in Central Asia in order to maintain high prices
or otherwise manipulate the market. But China seeks
guaranteed supplies at low prices. They have jostled
over Turkmenistan gas, a gas pipeline from Western
Siberia, and the oil pipeline from Taishet to Daqing.
If deals have eventually been reached, they came not
only after tough bargaining but also after questionable tactics not usually associated with commercial arrangements. Russians are increasingly nervous about
Chinese industrial exports and remain wary that
China aims to lock Siberia and the Russian Far East
into the secondary role of supplying natural resources
for Chinese manufacturing, symbolizing economic ascendancy. Although the onus is largely on Russia for
its ineffective and often criminalized management of
economic ties, the effect is to undermine confidence
in future economic cooperation. For example, in 2009
bilateral trade between Russia and China fell sharply
after several years of skyrocketing Chinese imports
from Russia. The fall-off in bilateral trade left Russians
with the impression that differentials in bilateral trading patterns were coming that would devastate Russia’s own industrial structure.
A third difference in strategic thinking centers on
the global system, exposing the shallowness of multipolarity as a unifying concept. As long as there was
a rough balance of power between the two states and
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a strong conviction that U.S. power was excessive
and being wielded aggressively, strategic balancing
brought them closer together. When in 2008-09 Russia weakened, China strengthened, and the United
States was perceived as declining and becoming less
assertive, disparities widened in perceptions of the
correct way to achieve a balance. This divergence operates in realist thinking about global issues and also
regional ones, notably Central Asia. China’s continuous inroads there since the mid-1990s were bound to
be viewed with increasing suspicion by Russia. After seeming agreement at the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) in 2005 over the rejection of U.S.
bases in Central Asia and condemnation of “color
revolutions,” Russia grew increasingly concerned that
China was outmaneuvering it in gaining access to energy and opening borders for trade and investment.
In 2009 China unilaterally offered the SCO a $10 billion anti-crisis stabilization fund after Russia refused
to co-finance it.15 Already, the anticipated struggle for
influence in the five Central Asian states has shifted
away from shared concerns about U.S. designs to open
competition. In this competition Russia is attempting
to draw these five states closer through the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a mutual defense organization with a stronger mandate than the
SCO, and to deny China its desired SCO free-trade
organization. But these steps do not suffice as sufficient reassurance to Russia. As U.S. policy shifts its
attention to this area in an effort to quell the danger in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. dependence on Russia is growing, as is the potential for increased mutual
understanding.
The fourth difference in strategic thinking between
Moscow and Beijing centers on the lingering question
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of cultural ties, long regarded as an even weaker factor in bilateral relations than economic ties and far
weaker than political ones. While for a time both sides
were making efforts to overcome negative stereotypes,
leading to joint projects such as the “Year of China” in
2006 and the “Year of Russia” in 2007, the main effort
now is by the Chinese side to woo Russians through
a barrage of news and propaganda about China. This
parallels the U.S. information campaign in the 1960s1980s that helped change the U.S. image in the Soviet
Union, but it might also backfire as being excessively
propagandistic from a country that relies heavily on
censorship.
National identity differences between China and
Russia are being tested in efforts to bridge the cultural divide. The main impetus for rising distrust is
likely to come from growing sinocentrism. While discussions of Chinese assertiveness regarding history
have focused on the half century of modern Japanese
imperialism or even on the ancient state of Koguryo
straddling the current Sino-Korean border, Russia is
not immune from similar charges. After all, in China’s
century of “humiliation,” no country acquired more
land deemed Chinese than Russia. At a time of rising
Chinese self-confidence or even arrogance, many Internet attacks on foreign countries are emanating from
China. Efforts by Chinese censors to keep a lid on criticisms of Russia are long-standing, but such efforts do
not prevent growing Russian mistrust.
Russians are torn between beseeching China to
support it in ways that are unlikely (e.g., making the
SCO a quasi-military organization to oppose NATO,
endorsing the Russian view of the 2008 war with Georgia, and recognizing South Ossetia as an independent
state, etc.),16 on one hand, and thwarting Chinese
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ambitions, when possible, in Central Asia and beyond, on the other. Skillful in outmaneuvering Russia in gaining access to energy and other resources in
Central Asia, China remains appreciative of bilateral
relations with Russia, despite often having grounds
for resentment. With its patience ebbing, Russia lacks
clarity on how to make a strategic correction.
In 2009 after Chinese entities had extended $25
billion in credits to Russian firms, concerns intensified that Russia was fated to remain a raw materials
supplier to China and could not escape becoming its
junior partner. Perceiving China as steering international relations toward a Sino-U.S. G-2 rather than
toward multipolarity, Russia sought reassurance that
China was not seeking such an exclusive status, but
did not get much satisfaction.17 In 2006-08, Russians
had been prone to criticize China for excessive dependency on the United States, as evinced by its hesitation to join Putin in his harsh criticisms of American
policy, fearful of damage to its economic interests. Yet,
in 2009 China repeatedly took a more assertive posture than Russia, as Chinese strategic thinking more
pointedly challenged U.S. hegemony and the philosophy of universal humanitarian values.18 This change
may have been welcome in some circles obsessed with
revenge against the triumphant American state that
had basked in the warm glow of victory at the end
of the Cold War, but for others it was a wake-up call
that Russia would now have to coexist with another
power—a rapidly rising one at that, one with national
goals that conflicted with Russia’s.
Indicative of the growing discontent on the Russian side over the way economic ties were developing was the turmoil caused by the police raids and
confiscations incident to the early summer 2009 clos-
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ing of Moscow’s huge Cherkizovsky Market. Facing
an increasingly large trade deficit and the anger of
domestic producers over the vast, poorly regulated
flow of Chinese goods into Russia, Putin resorted to
draconian methods to shut the market, causing losses
variously estimated from $2 to $7 billion.19 Given that
Russia had long accepted the underlying arrangement
of bulk shipments and approximate customs charges,
this abrupt action was a crude reminder of the arbitrariness of Russian law. Bilateral ties had been built
on such easy accommodations and quasi-market ad
hocery, and Russians were not inclined to normalize
markets now for fear they would be disadvantaged.
Chinese leaders remain keen on depicting current
bilateral ties in the best possible light. On the 60th
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1949, Hu Jintao wrote, “For the past 60 years
Chinese-Russian relations have passed an extraordinary way and turned into a new type of interstate relations matching the tendencies of the new times.”20 Yet,
Chinese insistence on glossing over problems fails to
explain how this supposedly “new type” of relationship can overcome the old realist thinking prevailing
in both states. Ironically, claims about what makes
this relationship different are couched in language
steeped in old thinking about hegemonism and the
balance of power. Western appeals for new thinking
about shared global threats cannot be accommodated
within such a weltanschauung.
At the time of this 60th anniversary, joint celebrations in Beijing insisted that relations were better than
ever and that the two sides had a shared destiny.
Praising Putin’s visit to Beijing on October 12-14, 2009,
analysts called for continued close cooperation as the
Western countries lose their dominant position in the
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global order, suggesting that as this shared goal comes
into sight, China and Russia can jointly flex their power.21 Yet, to Russians concerned that such a line of reasoning was nothing more than an appeal for them to
accept a junior status while seconding China’s rise as a
superpower, this kind of talk was losing its appeal. In
the shadow of China’s military parade and commemoration of 6 decades of socialism on October 1, the joint
remembrance had to gloss over the fact that for nearly
half this period, the two states had been ideological
opponents, with China fearing “big brother’s” control.
Now, ironically, a reviving sinocentric giant was rising alarm in Russia that “big brother” was morphing
into "little brother."
Claims about how close the Sino-Russian strategic
partnership is lack credibility, but that does not mean
the relationship should be disparaged as nothing
more than an axis of convenience. In the eyes of many
Russians, this expression may apply because they fear
becoming a junior partner of China and assume that
their country can readily switch directions and forge
a balanced triangle by bringing in the United States.22
They anticipate a shift from approaching China as a
function of Russian relations with the United States to
responding directly to China’s rise.23 Yet, this is not an
easy transition to achieve after its long-time campaign
of rancor against supposed U.S. hostile intent. Even as
Russians are awakening to China’s emboldened foreign policies no longer restrained by a sense of dependency on other powers, they are reluctant to confess
how Russia has abetted this transformation or how it
may be neutralized.24 As a sharp shift in China’s assertiveness becomes ever more apparent, Russia is
not inclined to resort to an outright volte-face in its
approach. Repositioning is likely to occur slowly and
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more subtly. It may even fail, as Russian actions fail to
match its rhetoric. Moreover, China may wield its increasing economic clout to dissuade Russia from any
sharp readjustments.
Globalization confronts China and Russia with at
least three urgent challenges that could either demonstrate their shared thinking or expose a widening gap
between them. As the critical actors in U.S.-led efforts
to prevent Iran and North Korea from establishing
themselves as nuclear powers, they are being tested
along the security dimension of globalization. Of late,
Russia’s position has become more cooperative, while
China has proven hesitant. As for the economic dimension, the focus has turned to China’s reluctance to
accept a reformed global system, in which it would refrain from holding its currency at artificially low levels,
which promote huge trade surpluses. Even Russia is
concerned about its growing trade deficit with China.
As for the climate dimension of globalization, the Copenhagen climate change summit of December 2009
left China targeted as the driving force against a binding, far-reaching agreement, while Russia drew little
notice. As the image spreads that China is obstructing
essential action on the most critical global problems,
Russia could oppositely reposition itself as a constructive partner in addressing them, but this could occur
only if it distanced itself from China in the robust way
it has shrunk from doing for nearly a decade. Provocations by China are less likely to induce this change
than changes in Russia’s relations with other states,
especially the United States, as Moscow recalculates
its long-term national interests.
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REPOSITIONING AND RELATIONS WITH
NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA
Russian analysts of Korea attribute great importance to the role of their country in supporting Korean
independence and unity, and serving as a balancing
force both in inter-Korean relations and in regional
maneuvering over the peninsula. “Loss of balance,”
which was said to occur when Russia was defeated
in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and when Russia
retreated from North Korea in the 1990s, is presumed
to have led to crises for the Korean people, as well as
damaging Russia’s regional leverage and the equilibrium in Northeast Asia. Resisting appeals to side firmly with the South in the face of North Korean nuclear
brinksmanship, Russian officials and observers seek
new ways to assert Moscow’s key balancing role.25
In the early Putin years, a direct connection with
Kim Jong Il was sought to put Russia at the center of
efforts to overcome the impasse in the South’s Sunshine Policy, though Putin treaded lightly in order to
avoid offending the United States after Russia joined
the newly established Six-Party Talks. During Putin’s
second term, most of the blame was placed on U.S.
inflexibility in failing to offer North Korea reasonable
compromises in the negotiations. Still, Russia eagerly
embraced the Joint Statement of September 2005 and
the Joint Agreement of February 2007 as constituting
the right sort of arrangements for Moscow’s influence
to grow in the course of the “action-for-action” steps
to follow.26 Only in 2009 did Russia finally come to
realize that North Korea was not looking for a compromise predicated on security guarantees and multilateral projects, but instead sought a lasting nuclear
weapons capability that did not happen to serve Rus-
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sian national interests—for at least three still-current
reasons. First, it prevents unification of the peninsula,
whereby Russia could gain a strong regional partner
after teaming with South Korea to build energy and
transportation infrastructure along a north-south axis.
Second, it worsens instability in Northeast Asia, spilling into the Russian Far East and obliging Russia to
fortify it. Third, China’s limited pressure on the North
as economic ties fill the vacuum left by others limits the
potential for Russia to keep playing an active role, as
through the Six-Party Talks. Thus, instead of becoming a major actor in Korean affairs, Moscow would be
marginalized by Beijing (not by Washington).
Current policy fits into a long-term framework of
defensive Soviet conduct on the Korean peninsula. In
recent mainstream Russian writings on North Korea,
criticism is rare. Instead of blaming Kim Jong Il for destabilizing developments, they credit him with pragmatism and realism in the face of George W. Bush’s
misguided attempts to achieve full global hegemony.
By assigning a large share of the responsibility to the
United States for failures at each stage of the recurring nuclear crisis, Russians burnish their self-image
as anti-proliferation and pro-peaceful reunification.
They can pretend to embrace such sentiments strictly
on the basis of the wishes of the Korean people, not
on the basis of so-called universal values imposed by
a Western power.27 Yet, this delusionary argument
misconceives the nature of the struggle and does not
help to resolve it. If Russians are cognizant of North
Korean duplicity yet unresponsive to Pyongyang’s
more extreme behavior, they are failing to prepare for
the inevitable showdown that will follow the North’s
insistence on maintaining its nuclear program.
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While the divide between Moscow and Beijing
toward Pyongyang is doubtless growing, we would
err in concluding that it is now a significant factor.
Memories of Russian impotence in the 1990s on Korean issues have yet to fade away. Concern lingers of
“regime change” in which South Korea has its way
without any need to take Russian views into account.
Repeated efforts by the leadership in Seoul to point to
long-term joint projects may suggest the merits of a
special relationship between two states peripheral to
the regional struggle between the United States and
China.28 However, Russia’s decade-long overtures to
Pyongyang demonstrate that Moscow is reliant on a
balancing role that stays in tune with Beijing. With
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak insisting that
inter-Korean ties must be reciprocal and must proceed
in tandem with progress on the nuclear issue, Russia
may regard him as too close to U.S. thinking, thus failing to provide the balance it seeks there. But Russia
will keep the door open for the future, awaiting a shift
in Kim Jong Il’s approach (or the approach of Kim
Jong Eun, his youngest son and heir apparent).
Russian economic ties with South Korea have advanced much more favorably than those with North
Korea. The latter still owes Russia $9 billion, which
it insists should be forgiven, since it did the Soviet
Union a huge favor in serving as its fortress in the east.
It fails to abide by trade agreements, at times reneging
on payments for goods that are delivered. It resorts to
deceitful trade practices, while shrugging off the results as not posing a problem for a rich, powerful state
such as Russia, which should be understanding of a
small state. Given such problems, it is not surprising
that Russia-North Korea trade has stagnated at $100$150 million a year.29
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Moscow claims that South Korea and Russia have
a special relationship growing out of shared interests,
and frequently suggests that this coincidence of interests could become the core of a regional framework of
cooperation. Yet, they bemoan South Korean dependence on the United States, asserting that the South
fails to pursue its own national interests because of
pressure from its ally. In taking this stance, they side
with former South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun’s
separation of inter-Korean ties from the denuclearization process. Moscow also complains about U.S. pressure that obliges South Korea to buy American arms
rather than Russian. While trade peaked with the
South at $20 billion in 2008, the Russians remain dissatisfied that its industrial products cannot find a market.30 Optimistic assumptions about projects under
construction or in planning were dashed by the negative impact of the world financial crisis. The Russians
also found Lee Myung-bak’s priority on a three-way
alliance with Japan and the United States, including
missile defense, contrary to Moscow’s regional strategy. Without adjusting to the new circumstances, Russia continued to claim that it alone strongly supports
balance between North and South, welcomes peaceful reunification, and, in supporting Security Council
resolutions while watering down their “anti-North
Korea” content, has the most constructive role in both
the Six-Party Talks and the UN Security Council.
As Russian resentment fades over its exclusion
from South Korea in the 1990s and as its over optimism concerning a special Russian role in the first
half of the 2000s has also faded, a more sober outlook
could highlight authentic potential for a partnership
with South Korea. This would be facilitated by Lee’s
deep interest in both energy diplomacy and a regional
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balance of power and by invigorated triangular U.S.Japanese-South Korea ties that could be partially extended, as in the case of joint development projects
in the Russian Far East. While one objective would be
to convince North Korea of the urgency of denuclearization, another would be to beckon it with plans
for inter-Korean transportation and energy networks
should it start to reform.
REPOSITIONING AND RUSSO-JAPANESE
RELATIONS
Despite difficulties in normalizing relations with
Japan, Russian analysts still concede that underrating the importance of this great power has not served
Russian strategic aims or the development of the RFE
well. Even if trade skyrocketed by over 50 percent a
year in 2007 and 2008, disproving the argument that
a territorial deal is a prerequisite to close economic
ties, the view in Russia prevails that a breakthrough
has not yet been reached solely as a result of Japan’s
refusal to offer anything in return for its demands for
Russian territorial concessions. At the same time, Russians acknowledge that their own poor investment climate, especially in the Russian Far East where Japan’s
role is eagerly sought, accounts for the still inadequate
level of economic cooperation.31
Given Japanese concerns about China’s rise and its
recurrent obsession with the territorial problem, some
Russians contend that Japan needs Russia more than
the other way around.32 Such an argument only leads
to a dead-end. Fearing loss of leverage over the territorial dispute, neither side has shown much interest in explaining to its own people the importance of
a compromise solution and a bilateral breakthrough.
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The emotional backlash against Japanese tactics in the
early 1990s, as well as against perceived U.S. disregard
for Russian interests, keeps skewing the debate away
from objective analysis of how Russia can benefit from
greatly improved relations.
Since Japan backtracked from its compromise approach to the territorial dispute in 2001, Russia has
struggled to put relations on a forward-looking track.
For a time, the best hope was that Japanese leaders, as
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi seemed to indicate
in 2003, would set the territorial issue aside in order
to join in building an oil pipeline to the Pacific coast.
It was assumed that Japan was driven by geopolitical
goals no less than energy security in striving to outflank
China. From 2006 to 2008, another cautious upswing
in relations put emphasis on all-around economic ties,
as trade rose rapidly and Japanese firms looked to the
Russian market optimistically. Yet, sensitivity over Japan’s pursuit of four problematic islands was never
far below the surface, encouraging minor irritants to
balloon into major impediments.
On September 17, 2009, Yukio Hatoyama began
his tenure as Prime Minister by making Medvedev the
object of his first call. Given this symbolic move and
the presence of one of Hatoyama’s sons at Moscow
State University, some expected a new Japanese initiative toward Russia.33 In bringing back into the top
leadership Suzuki Muneo, who had been castigated
for pursuing a compromise approach with Russia in
the talks in 2000-01 and then sent to jail for misuse
of funds before being reelected to the Diet, Hatoyama
brightened the prospects for quickly addressing the
concerns of the displaced Kuril islanders surviving on
Hokkaido.Yet, as seen in negotiations in 1986-93 and
1997-2001, the negotiating process takes considerable

83

time to gain momentum. Hatoyama felt himself to be
in no position to press ahead, unsettling the bureaucracy with his insistence that now politicians, including Suzuki, would take charge but failing to forge a
unified cabinet and to provide clear directions.
Waiting for the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
to clarify how Russia fits into Japan’s new Asian-centered diplomacy, Russians look back to Foreign Minister Yasuo Fukuda’s visit on April 25-26, 2008, when an
earlier prime minister was also exploring broadened
ties in Asia. Trade between the two states had already
been booming for several years, and Putin’s November 2005 visit was recalled as an impetus for intensified economic cooperation. In November 2006 he and
Prime Minister Abe had upgraded ties to a “strategic
dialogue,” but that had not led to progress on the territorial issue. Fukuda’s interest in Russia was seen as
much weaker than in China, but after Medvedev was
elected, Fukuda supported a move beyond the “Russia-Japanese Action Plan” toward a more strategically
oriented understanding, including gaining Russian
support for Japan’s initiative on climate change at the
2008 G-8 summit on Hokkaido.34 Yet, doubts about
Japanese perceptions of Russia remain strong, ranging from negative images of its historical conduct (the
1905 war) to entrenched negative public opinion on
its “unlawful” occupation of the disputed islands.
Without a more positive vision of how they are perceived and what might be achieved together, Russians
remain reluctant to explore a compromise.35
Former Foreign Ministry Director General Togo
Kazuhiko, who led the bilateral talks to 2001 before
they were interrupted by an internal Japanese dispute,
recently gave his views on how to revitalize negotiations. He first noted that messages from Russian lead-
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ers for several years have had a more upbeat tone
about prospects for resumed talks, especially Medvedev’s stress at the G-8 meeting in Hokkaido in July
2008 on a dramatic change in relations followed by his
remarks to Prime Minister Taro Aso on Sakhalin in
February 2009, plus Putin’s remarks to former Prime
Minister Mori in May 2009. Togo suggested returning
to the Irkutsk agreement of March 2001, when both
sides agreed to intense negotiations. Seeing improved
Russo-U.S. relations as positive for broadening the
scope for Russo-Japanese talks, Togo argued that the
international environment is now favorable. Moreover, even as Sino-Russian relations are proceeding
well, Russian concerns about the imbalance due to
China’s rise leads it to value Japan as a reinforcer of
balance. In the new economic conditions where Russia is anxious to broaden its energy clientele, Japan’s
economy has greater appeal. Yet, Medvedev made
clear at the July 2009 G-8 that parliamentary bombast
from both sides interferes with the quiet talks that are
needed. Setting the stage for his active involvement,
Hatoyama in September in their first meeting at the
UN recalled his grandfather’s regret at not signing
a peace treaty and noted that this had had negative
consequences for both states. In trying to normalize
diplomatic relations, Ichiro Hatoyama had even contemplated abandoning claims on all four islands Having recounted as many as five missed opportunities
in negotiations since the mid-1980s, Togo addressed
doubters in Japan in appealing for a sixth chance.
His logic raised hopes in Russia too that a new
opportunity awaits;36 yet, on November 24, 2009, an
official Japanese response to a parliamentary query
by Suzuki used the term “unlawful occupation” (fuho
senkyo), and a December meeting of foreign ministers
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from the two countries suggested to the Russians that
Hatoyama was not preparing a strategy to move forward. There was little optimism at year end, as Togo
also lost hope.37 Yet, with the DPJ still at an early stage
of its incumbency, Russians could benefit by toning
down their anger and preparing for another round of
negotiations. Given the Russian goal of diversification
of partners amidst an upswing in Russo-U.S. relations,
its seizing upon two offensive words ill consorts with
a serious strategy of treating Hatoyama as a prime instrument in Medvedev’s pragmatic foreign policy of
repositioning Russia in Asia.
Japan’s failure since 2001 to negotiate in earnest
over a compromise short of four islands in a batch
does not mean that Russia must set aside hopes of a
breakthrough. Now in flux, Japanese politics are likely
to produce more surprises. Signs of improving RussoU.S. and Russo-South Korean relations would send
an unmistakable signal that Japan can benefit from
its own Russian initiative. After all, the DPJ is likely
to be frustrated in its contradictory China-centered
diplomacy and marginalized in dealing with North
Korea. If it does not want simply to fall back on the
U.S. alliance, as its rival the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) kept doing, Russia offers a promising option for
a symbolic breakthrough. Both sides would have to
provide frequent reassurances through careful diplomacy after years of disappointment.
THE U.S. ROLE IN NORTHEAST ASIA AND
RUSSIAN REPOSITIONING
For nearly 2 decades Russians were attracted to zero-sum logic in reasoning about U.S. power in Northeast Asia. Only by containing or reducing this power
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could Russia find its own niche. The opposite viewpoint, i.e., that the two former superpowers are natural partners, was advocated by many Americans, but
it had trouble gaining traction. Not only has the rise of
China and the U.S. decline in 2008-09 given cause for
further reflection, a debate on how to pursue Russian
modernization—a favorite theme of Medvedev—has
led some to cast doubt on the relevance of the Chinese model and to renew attention to how closer ties
with the United States and other Western countries
would facilitate the domestic transformation of Russia
as well as its foreign policy.38 The limits of the former
model of growth in Russia were more clearly exposed,
as doubts about the applicability or desirability of the
Chinese model were highlighted. Yet, this discussion
of comparative development options could not easily be divorced from a simultaneous debate about the
merits of continuing a foreign policy that had alienated Russia from Western nations. Moreover, misgivings about the vulnerability of the Russian Far East in
the shadow of China’s relentless rise were not abating.
The potential is growing for Russia to shift Westward,
but it is unlikely to make a sudden or sharp aboutface.
From the Russian perspective, weighing the United States against China has a far-reaching historical
component. It is linked to assessments of 1989-91 on
why the Soviet Union collapsed, how China dealt
with challenges to communist rule, and what were
U.S. intentions after the end of the Cold War. Looking
further back to the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of
World War II, the debate recalls how Stalin delayed
the Soviet Union’s entry into the war and his legacy
as war-time leader and central figure in the building
of socialism. Moreover, it refers to the meaning of
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the Bolshevik Revolution with its parallels in China.
Medvedev’s wary response to Putin’s nostalgic recollections of the Soviet era has reignited discussion,
while association of China with this legacy means that
the tradition of viewing China through the lens of the
struggle between rival camps in Moscow survives.39
As confusion over Russian national identity continues,
China and the United States will keep being invoked
either as a promising model or detested antithesis, by
those intent on shaping domestic politics and defending vested interests in ways that take many years to
resolve. Outsiders must avoid a rush to optimism, as
in the 1990s.
In the George W. Bush administration, there was
a U.S. strategy toward Japan, which proved myopic,
and toward North Korea, which reached an impasse
in 2008. Ad hoc policies dealt with China in myriad
arenas and with South Korea in difficult times before
2008. There was no strategic vision of Russia’s proper
place in Asia nor was one possible given Putin’s priorities and the challenges faced by Bush. In 2009 Obama
was preparing for a regional strategy guided by Kurt
Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State. Given the intensification of China’s challenge, the uncertainty of
DPJ Asian policies, and the seriousness of the North
Korean threat, there is a new logic for including Russia in a regional strategy. This could occur through the
5 + 1 nature of the Six-Party Talks, which might well
entail U.S.-led consultations with the other four states
to the extent China agrees to proceed without North
Korea involved. It also can occur through intensified
three-party talks with Japan and South Korea that create an amicable opening for Russian cooperation. Of
course, Russo-U.S. talks will be tested by other priorities. Only if they cross these hurdles can we anticipate
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a follow-up agenda in Asia. The principal arena for
repositioning in this region is bilateral talks with the
United States. This was the case for Gorbachev and
Yeltsin, and it remains true for the Medvedev-Putin
tandem if they are prepared to make some tough decisions.
CONCLUSION
In 2007-08 conditions favoring a Russian Chinafirst strategy peaked. Among them were animosity toward the Bush administration, alarm about the color
revolutions, optimism about energy prices, opportunism regarding the Korean peninsula, and pessimism
about Japanese political ties mixed with newfound
confidence about economic ties. The result was not a
well-considered, long-term strategy, but exaggerated
hopes such as that Russia would rise to become part
of a G-3 and that Vladivostok would emerge as one of
the few cities that serve as regional centers in Northeast Asia. By early 2010, conditions favored a different Russian strategy toward the region. Among them
were cautious trust toward the Obama administration, signs that leaders associated with the color revolutions had lost popularity at home, subdued sobriety
about energy prices and economic prospects, more
realism toward the destabilizing impact of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) in North Korea as well as
Iran, and new prospects for normalization with Japan,
the latter now recognized as a necessary prelude for
a new approach to economic ties. Thus, for balance of
power reasons, as well as economic growth and reform, a different strategy was being explored by Russia. This did not mean reversing engagement toward
China and containment of the United States, but it
could signify a balanced triangle of the three powers.
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Standing in the way of a new Russian strategy is
more than a decade of reflexive demonization of the
United States, drawing on residual assumptions rooted in Soviet thinking. A worldview was revived centered on a putative U.S. quest for world domination.
After a period of self-criticism focused on revelations
about the falsehoods of Soviet historiography, Russian national pride became closely associated with the
defense of Soviet foreign policy in Asia as elsewhere.
In the second half of the 1990s, “Atlanticism” was
discredited, while various versions of a vague notion
known as “Eurasianism” gained prominence. Despite
recurrent references to devious Chinese motives, the
tone toward China perforce grew more respectful in
the new decade, while that toward the United States
became hostile, not only for its “nefarious” maneuvers from Ukraine to Iraq, but also for its seemingly
perverse strategy in Asia. Full reversal of this outlook
is unlikely; a gradual buildup of trust is increasingly
possible.
Hopes for a Russian breakthrough with Japan or
South Korea lack a strategic rationale. The idea that
one or the other would turn to Russia in pursuit of
a multipolar balance, energy security, or a check on
China proved unrealizable. So too did the prospect of
gaining leverage over them through closer ties to China or North Korea. The enduring reality is that these
two states remain reliable U.S. allies, even when individual leaders strive to demonstrate a degree of independence. At the same time, the two have fast become
closely integrated with China’s economy in ways that
prevent overt balancing. In order to improve relations
significantly, Russia must first strengthen ties to the
United States as a sign it is overcoming security mistrust or join in regional economic integration through
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long-term projects. Its nationalist inclinations under
Yeltsin and Putin eliminated those choices, but Medvedev may offer hope. As Northeast Asia increasingly
becomes a contested arena between the United States
and China, aspirations for a balance of power based on
improved ties to the middle powers require shifting
away from the China-first strategy adopted by Putin.
This means a regional strategy in pursuit of increased
globalization and multilateral cooperation.
Russian repositioning in Northeast Asia would be
best realized through at least four steps undertaken
with U.S. cooperation: (1) continued attempts at engagement through close consultations centered on
Medvedev’s moderate goals, building trust but not
sacrificing essential U.S. objectives; (2) three-way alliance cooperation in building bridges with Russia, as
Japan and South Korea benefit from U.S. encouragement to forge an Asia-Pacific community and, within
it, to appeal to Russia to proceed with improved relations, which were set back after the early 1990s and
again after the early 2000s; (3) a strategy combining
carrots and sticks toward North Korea, which accepts
Russian ties to the North as long as they are consistent with the overall denuclearization strategy; and
(4) a U.S.-led strategy toward China that puts no pressure on Russia to contain its partner and shows the
sincerity of the U.S. strategic economic and security
dialogue, but also presses China on each challenge of
globalization and denies its designs for sinocentrism
while seeking Russian understanding. Suggestions
that Russia may be part of any containment of China
or weakening of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership are likely to be counterproductive. Russian repositioning is most likely if it combines the strength
of recent ties to China with the additional strength of
improved ties to the three allies in the region.
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While no dramatic leadership change in Russia is
anticipated, such as occurred in 1985, 1992, and 2000,
the decade of the 2010s is likely to bring some surprises in policy toward Northeast Asia. This is due to
far-reaching shifts in the regional context as well as
profound concern in Russia about its interests in the
region. U.S. attentiveness to Russian interests and dialogue can facilitate such a transformation. South Korea
is a promising partner in this endeavor. Japan has an
interest too, but both its pragmatism and its coordination with the United States and South Korea remain to
be tested. Above all, the evolution of the old strategic
triangle of Sino-Russian-U.S. relations will shape Russian thinking. Only with a multilateral strategic logic
that appeals to Russia’s own worldview is it likely
that a common understanding will pave the way to a
mutually beneficial regional strategic realignment.
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